Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
On May 31 he met with J. Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest 0. Lawrence, Enrico
Fermi, and Arthur H. Compton, the most prominent physicists involved in the
project. Then, and at other times, Stimson described the atomic bomb as “a
revolutionary change that held great promise and great danger for
ci~ilization.”~~ In the summer of 1945, the true effects of the new weapon were
unrealized, and it had not yet acquired the quasi-mystical qualities some would
later ascribe to it. More than anything else, the lack of information on Japan
dogged the efforts of the A-2 in studying the country and lent little knowledge
to the men who decided the question of using atomic weapons.
Planning for the bombing of Japan faced several serious problems. For years
the A-2’s analysts and the COA had recognized the significantly poorer level
of intelligence available for Japan. Unlike their fairly substantial knowledge
regarding Germany, where active British aerial photography and data collection
efforts preceded the war’s beginning, the Americans understood the relationships
of the several segments of Japan’s industrial base only incompletely.
Compounding the problem of insufficient target information, the AAF’s
strategic bombardment program, while well conceived theoretically, fell victim
to an inability to meet the technical demands of precision bombing. In Europe,
bombardiers had difficulty finding German targets and then in hitting them
accurately, once found. These difficulties were only slightly alleviated when
radar was used. Due to its technical immaturity, radar failed to satisfy the needs
of Spaatz and his people in Europe. Intelligence could not compensate for the
technical deficiencies, but an extensive interplay between technology and
intelligence existed. Once the Pacific bombing effort began in earnest, the
frailties of the equipment were magnified. The 200-mile-per-hour winds in the
jet stream high above Japan prevented accurate visual aiming from nearly
30,000 feet. Radar provided some help, but it could not overcome problems
associated with weather over Japan, where clear days were no more frequent
than they were over Germany. When General LeMay remarked to Arnold that
weather was his worst operational enemy, he added, “Our attempts to bomb
precision targets at night have failed because we do not have the proper tools to
do the job. Bombardiers have not been able to synchronize on the target with the
flares and [bomb] sight we ha~e.”~’Arnold, faced with justifying the cost of the
huge strategic bomber force, required results, and he insisted on them when
dealing with his subordinates. Facing pressures to use the new aircraft
effectively, the military also had to contend with the prospect of fighting
Japanese troops on the ground.
From the engagement at Guadalcanal in August 1942, the Japanese had
fought American forces in the Pacific bitterly, bravely, and to the death virtually
every time contact occurred. The fanatical resistance encountered on Saipan,
Iwo Jima, and Okinawa was simply the culmination of long combat experience.
Secretary Stimson recognized the cost of a campaign in Japan’s home islands
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