Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The Pacific and Far East
to include information from Japanese or USSBS records of air attacks made by
his men. This collection held copies of correspondence and messages, plus
assorted items such as orders and memoranda. Kenney sometimes noted the
source of his information about the enemy: that from Japanese messages he
referred to as “hot information” or “the latest dope.” Sometimes he used the
word “ultra,” referring to what the local Allied code breakers had delivered or
to decrypted information from the Navy at Pearl Harbor or from MIS in
Washington. In this regard Kenney was unique among AAF commanders,
although he reflected the generally lax security procedures in the command.
Intelligence leads from several sources prompted Kenney and Whitehead to
make some important decisions. Kenney’s November 1942 proposal to fly
troops to Dobodura and then supply them by air as they attacked Buna was
based on his knowledge that no Japanese were within fifteen miles of the
proposed landing ground. Heavy aerial fighting in the Solomon Islands meant
that Japanese air forces would be limited in their ability to support their army
in the Buna-Dobodura area. Fifth Air Force attacks on Rabaul, 450 miles from
Port Moresby, further hampered Japanese air opposition?’
The Papuan campaign followed the successful ground defenses of the Port
Moresby-Milne Bay area in September 1942. The feasibility of carrying out a
concerted effort to take Buna and Gona was questioned by some at GHQ in
Australia because of logistics difficulties and the lack of roads in the area.
Kenney ’s limited troop carriers could move only about half the needed supplies,
with the remainder going by sea to landing areas south of Buna. Despite the
problems and weeks of vicious, bloody fighting, the Allied campaign culminated
in late January 1943 with the capture of Buna and Gona by American 32d
Division and Australian 7th Division infant~ymen.~’
In 1942, Japanese attention centered primarily on the Solomon Islands; they
had few combat aircraft on New Guinea. Some days they had no more than
sixteen on the island; rarely were there more than twice that number. Aerial
reconnaissance by Fifth Air Force B-17s or B-24s tracked the airfields along
the Japanese-held coast and at New Britain’s bases as well. When in 1943 the
number of Japanese$ aircraft listed in the Fifth’s Daily Summary of Principal
Activities increased to the point that the enemy presented a danger, the wellstocked
Japanese airfields became the target of Whitehead’s bombers-if not
at Kenney’s direct insistence, then as a result of his well-understood policy of
destroying opposing air forces before they could strike Allied airfields. The
intelligence information supporting such operations normally came from theater
sources such as aerial observation and photography supplemented by radio
traffic analysis. As the war progressed and as American skills in decrypting
Japanese message traffic increased, important information appeared from
outside the Southwest Pacific theater. One such series of reports came originally
from the U.S. Navy and was to have a significant impact on Fifth Air Force for
the remainder of the war.32
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