Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
as Leyte was within the SWPA, and in a complicated discussion between the
Joint Staff, Nimitz’s staff, and MacArthur’s people, Leyte became the place of
first landing during the American return to the Philippines. MacArthur had long
intended to retake the archipelago, but two of his subordinates made the
decision while he was at sea and the crew of the ship was observing radio
silence. Kenney and Sutherland, prompted by the possibility that Nimitz would
seek approval if the SWPA commander seemed reluctant, took it upon
themselves to decide on the Leyte operation and to so inform the JCS on
September 16. MacArthur quickly agreed on his return the next day.”
Kenney decided the Leyte question in the belief that he would have the
upper hand in any air campaign. He seems to have done so based on the ULTRA
indications of Japan’s strategic withdrawal to the northern Philippines-
Formosa-home islands, Japan’s decidedly defensive air dispositions and types
of aircraft in the Philippines that would limit offensive reactions, and her rate
of aircraft loss and diminishing pilot and aircraft replacement capability. The
FEAF commander had concluded that Japanese air power in the Philippines
“was shot,” although he could not rule out a successful Japanese reaction to the
projected landings. Of most concern to Kenney was the need to quickly seize
and expand airfields on Leyte to provide land-based air cover to the men ashore.
Until bases were in use, the Navy’s aircraft-limited in number, range, and
firepower and flying from carriers vulnerable to air, surface, and submarine
attack-would have to bear the load of protection, for Fifth and Thirteenth Air
Forces had too few airfields within operational range of Leyte. Preparatory air
attacks by Halsey’s carriers against Japanese bases on Luzon had resulted in
reportedly large losses of enemy aircraft. Although the Allies knew the Japanese
defensive dispositions and their air, land, and sea OB, they were uncertain of the
way the Japanese would use those forces when they responded to the direction
of Allied moves. Moreover, Allied intelligence estimated that by October 20 the
Japanese had 27,000 soldiers on Leyte and adjacent Samar. This number of
Japanese, far more than Halsey’s information, was not in itself a major danger
to the projected landings. The risk to the Allies was from naval and air
counterstrikes?8
Allied landing forces initially had little trouble on Leyte, seizing Tacloban
on October 20th and Dulag on the 21st. Immediately, work began on airfields
at both sites. Confusion ashore, with equipment and supplies piled on the
beaches, delayed construction of the vital bases. On the 23d, Seventh Fleet
intelligence officers discerned a major Japanese fleet seemingly headed toward
Leyte, partly from Brunei, with the remainder coming through the Surigao
Strait. The ensuing battle for Leyte Gulf forced American naval aircraft from
four small escort carriers into a desperate fight. The success of the Navy flyers,
and Japanese misperceptions of the American fleet’s locations, resulted in an
Allied victory that fended off a potentially highly destructive Japanese foray
into the center of the vulnerable landing force. Finally, on October 26, thirty-
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