Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
James Doolittle, “These ‘JOCKEYS’ are not adirective. They are issued weekly
by the Air Ministry for information only . . .” to give commanders an idea of
“Air Ministry opinion on the relative importance of G.A.F. targets.”73 Through
the summer of 1943 the gap between what intelligence indicated should be done
and the operational limitations that restricted what was possibleremained broad.
Three months before the POWTBLANK directive, Colonel Hughes had advised
Eaker, “Our primary target should be the German Fighter Force in the air, and
on the ground, and the industry which supports it.”74 To effectively attack
enemy fighters required an offensive capability that did not exist; Eighth Air
Force could reach only 43 percent of the fighter assembly plants and 25 percent
of the fighter-engine production plants.75
While British and American economic analysts correctly recommended
fighter engines as the key target in the aircraft industry, intelligence information
regarding the location of engine factories was vaguer than that which indicated
aircraft assembly plants. Analysts believed that the German authorities had
concentrated engine factories around Berlin and Vienna, thus putting them out
of range of Great Britain-based forces. Intelligence officers estimated some 60
percent of single-engine fighter airframe production was concentrated in eight
plants located within striking distance of East Anglia?6 The critical need to gain
air superiority also dictated an emphasis on airframe assembly rather than on
engines because analysts believed effective strikes against this subsystem would
hurt the GAF’s combat effectiveness within a month, as opposed to a two- to
three-month lag in the case of engines.77
Lacking fighter escort, long-range capability, and experienced crews in the
summer of 1943, Eaker sent his force primarily against targets in occupied
Europe rather than over Germany. The Eighth Air Force’s heavy bombers flew
only nine effective missions into Germany in June and July, four of which had
as primary targets submarine yards and shipyards and port areas. Despite these
rather meager statistics, Eaker could take heart in the fact that his air force hit
targets in Germany on five of the last seven days of July, including major
assaults on aircraft assembly concentrations?8
One of the disturbing trends intelligence monitored in the summer of 1943
was the change in location of German aircraft production, especially fighters.
In mid-August, McDonald received a report from the OSS research and analysis
branch warning him that over the past two years aircraft production “has shifted
markedly eastward.” Only 12 percent of single-engine fighter production was
now occurring within 500 miles of London. The enemy was now building 80
percent of his air force within 400 miles of northern Italy. The Allies could
expect this trend to continue, since the potential benefits of the manufacturing
layout to the Axis outweighed the temporary disruption^?^
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