Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Creating the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence
In the years preceding World War 11, the U.S. Army Air Corps and then the
AAF had undergone a series of reorganizations as the nation searched for the
proper roles for air power and the means to accomplish them. As an essential
element in the planning and execution of air operations, air intelligence within
the Air Corps and AAF had been affected each time a change occurred. The
onset of war did not eliminate organizational issues or questions of responsibil-
ity regarding air intelligence functions; if anything, the crises the United States
now faced exacerbated the dilemma while underscoring the urgency of a
resolution. One of the major themes in the evolution of air intelligence and its
impact on planning and operations in the first part of the war was the ongoing
effort to develop the most effective air intelligence structure within AAF
headquarters in Washington and to determine its relationships with its Army
and Navy counterparts.
Pearl Harbor demonstrated the ineffectiveness of American military and
naval intelligence and revealed that at least part of the problem stemmed from
the lack of Army-Navy cooperation regarding intelligence. To secure coopera-
tion and coordination on all matters involving joint action of the U.S. Army and
Navy, on January 23, 1942, the Secretaries of War and Navy directed a
reorganization of the Joint Army-Navy Board plus the creation of a Joint Army-
Navy Planning Committee and Joint Strategic Committee to supplement the
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The duties of the JIC were to prepare daily
joint summaries of military and other directly related intelligence for the
president and other high officials, and such other special information and
intelligence studies as the joint board required. The JIC was to have full access
to MID and Naval Intelligence Division files. When the JCS organization
replaced the Joint Army-Navy Board in February 1942, the committees
established to support the joint board continued under the JCS. Like other JCS
committees, the JIC prepared papers concerning agenda items for the JCS ’s
meetings. l6
In March 1942, a War Department reorganization created three autonomous
and coordinate commands under the Chief of Staff: Army Ground Forces, AAF,
and Services of Supply (later the Army Service Forces). The implementing
directive reaffirmed the overall planning, coordination, and supervisory role of
the WDGS, but it prohibited the General Staff from involvement in administra-
tive details and operating activities of these commands. Although the directive
authorized Air Corps officers to comprise 50 percent of the General Staff, that
goal would not be reached because of the scarcity of qualified Air Corps
officers. With respect to intelligence, the reorganization authorized G-2 to
enlarge his Air Section, and it buttressed his responsibility for collecting all
intelligence, both air and ground.” The March 1942 reorganization amalgam-
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