Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
effort of 250 sorties, would be “ample to secure a very material decrease in the
operating efficiency of these installations within a reasonable time.”’4x
Whether this assessment reflected the views of senior commanders is an
interesting question. According to several individuals working with him, Spaatz
was “absolutely livid” over the diversion of resources to this mission.’4Y In a
long letter on the subject to Edward Mason of the OSS, Chandler Morse, head
of the EOU in London, observed, “The 8th Air Force is extremely unhappy over
its directive to attack submarines . . . ” since, despite heavy losses and diversion
from its primary mission against targets in Germany, the campaign did not
appear to be having any effect. Referring specifically to the January 16 report
to Arnold, Morse offered his opinion that this memo “tends to make attacks on
bases appear to be more successful than the officers at WIDE WING [HQ Eighth
Air Force] really believe they are.”1so At the same time, however, Eaker was
writing to Arnold that he believed the campaign “has had a material effect” on
the reduction in shipping losses.”’
By the middle of January, then, assessments of the value of heavy-bomber
attacks on the Biscay operating bases varied widely. The only near consensus
was that construction yards were not worthwhile targets, at least in the short run
(less than a year). Nevertheless, in the Casablanca Directive of January 21,
1943, the Anglo-American CCS made submarine construction yards the first
priority for the Allied bomber offensive. Although not specifically listed, the
chiefs clearly considered the operating bases in France within the category of
targets that merited concentrated efforts because of “great importance either
from the political or military” point of view.’” The MF’s ACAS, Operations
urged Eighth Air Force to focus future attacks on Biscay bases when weather
prevented attacks on submarine construction yards in northern Germany.lS3 In
all, submarine facilities were the target for 63 percent of the total tonnage that
VIII Bomber Command dropped in the first quarter of 1943 and 52 percent of
the total expended during the second quarter.IS4
In the six months after the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the
Allies gained the upper hand in the Atlantic. A variety of measures contributed
to what proved the decisive swing in a pendulum that had moved back and forth
for several years. The breaking of the German Navy’s Enigma code, the
introduction of improved tactics and technical equipment (including extensive
defensive and offensive air patrols), and the sheer expansion of resources led to
a dramatic reduction in shipping losses by the late spring of 1943. Evidence on
the impact of air strikes against U-boat bases in France remained inconclusive,
but at best they slowed down the turnaround times of operating boats and, to
that extent, had some effect on the trend of events. German records indicate the
attacks on the construction yards by either VIII or RAF Bomber Commands
only negligibly affected the production of U-boats.’”
The Allied air campaign against German U-boats illustrates several points
about air intelligence. In the first, basic policy decisions, especially with regard
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