Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
or decrypted, and because, in the confusion of combat, enemy units sometimes
failed to send reports, or they sent incomplete or inaccurate data. Within 36
hours of the invasion, Allied intelligence had identified some 300 of the
400-450 aircraft the Germans would move into the Normandy region by June
Domination of the GAF that had been established in the opening days of
NEPTUNE continued through the summer, although the ability to monitor
frequently, often instantaneously, active airfields and their condition was not
always possible. When it was, it allowed commanders and intelligence officers
an unprecedented look at the enemy’s intentions and his ability to execute them,
his losses, and the status of his aircraft and equipment.Is3 These effects were felt
in several ways. First, if a decrypted message was seen in time and evaluated
correctly, it could provide guidance for mission planning. Messages such as the
one sent to subordinate units by Jugdkorps ZZon August 26 directing operations
for the next day contained not only the type of missions and the areas of
operation, but the location and altitude of rendezvous points as well.ls4
Similarly, the approval from an unidentified headquarters of Melsbroek and
Chievres airfields in Belgium as collection points for FW 190s and Bf 109s
provided the appropriate Allied target officers with invaluable inf~rmation.’~~
Often such messages were received too late to provide immediate operational
direction.
For this reason, ULTRA’S more valuable contribution continued to be
confirmation of and insight into the effects of operations against the GAF. On
July 9, BP decrypted a message from Goering decreeing that “because of the
intolerable loss in unit commanders” these officers would fly only “when the
significance of the operation and number of aircraft employed make it
ne~essary.”’~~ In early August, just as the Allied armies began their breakout
from Normandy, Jugdkorps ZZ (responsible for close support to the German
Army) advised Berlin it was pulling back four of its best gruppen for rest and
refit.”’ Considering the desperate situation confronting the German Army, such
a move must have been seen by Allied air commanders as a clear indication of
the Luhufe’s battered condition. Two weeks later, this same headquarters
advised its superiors that it could not participate effectively in the battle at
Falaise because units were repeatedly attacked as they tried to take off. Two
groups had lost twenty-two planes in this way in one day.’”
Tactical SIGINT proved especially valuable in operations against the
already weakened GAF. With the establishment of Detachment 3, 3d Radio
Squadron (Mobile), on the continent only three days after the initial landings,
USAAF tactical air forces began independent signals interception, although they
continued to maintain links with British units. The focal point for this
undertaking, much of which was time-sensitive, was the SIGINT officer located
at IX TAC fighter control, who was in direct contact with airborne aircraft and
HQ IX TAC.Is9
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