Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
interpretation of signals and special intelligence indicated that the Japanese
were about to make a major move to reinforce Lae. At the same time, a major
refitting of American B-25 medium bombers carried out on the scene gave
aircrews enhanced capabilities to strike targets at low level. Finally, Kenney and
his subordinates (operators as well as intelligence officers) carefully recon-
structed the routing that the Japanese had used in previous convoys to Lae. The
result of all this care and patience was a devastatingly effective attack on the
Japanese convoy, exactly where Kenney and Whitehead had planned to strike
(and almost at the exact time). All the supply ships were sunk and a number of
Japanese soldiers were rescued, although without arms, ammunition, or supplies
they were worse than useless.6’ For the Japanese, the effect of the losses in the
battle of the Bismarck Sea were immediate and adverse. Allied success had
turned on the extraordinarily competent integration of intelligence with tactical
flexibility and adaptation. No better example exists in World War I1 of the
skillful combination of intelligence and operational capabilities in battle.
Despite occasional troubles such as those in the Admiralties and during the
first Philippine landings brought on by exuberance and an unwarranted
contempt for his enemy’s abilities, George Kenney’s use of intelligence after
the Bismarck Sea operation retained by and large this level of effectiveness
because of two factors. First, he picked excellent subordinates and used them
well; he gave them the authority and support to get on with the job. In 1943,
Kenney’s handling of Allied air units broke the back of the Japanese air power
operating in New Guinea. By understanding that the heart of the Japanese
defensive system lay in their well-stocked bases used to shuttle aircraft back and
forth within the theater, he struck at the bases themselves. With the base
structure severely debilitated, Japanese air power simply withered, and
Kenney’s forces gained general air superiority in the skies over New Guinea.
The second major factor that allowed General Kenney to continue his successful
use of intelligence was the extraordinary extent to which the Allies in SWPA,
Pearl Harbor, and Washington had penetrated Japanese signals transmissions.
By 1944, intelligence was providing MacArthur and his land, sea, and air forces
with a continuing reading of Japan’s overall situation and her plans for air
operations.
By 1944 the Japanese armed forces were in retreat, but they could still
muster a substantial air task force in reaction to Allied landings. The appearance
of their task forces came by surprise, since ULTRA had not detected the units
well in advance. Despite this unexpected development, Japan’s weakness
prevented her from sustaining an effective air campaign as a barrier to further
Allied advances. Having defeated Japanese air power, the question then became
less one of holding air superiority in support of the Philippine campaign than of
supporting the Army and Navy in combat with the Japanese ground and naval
forces in the Philippine Islands. Again Kenney showed himself to be a master
at adapting to the conditions. By the end of the war, he was concentrating his
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