Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
Emphasis on the V-weapons in the winter of 1943-1 944 stemmed from two
concerns. The first was the social and political issue of the effect of large-scale,
even if inaccurate, air attacks on London. The second involved the potential
impact of these weapons on the massive land, naval, and air forces being
assembled for the assault on Fortress Europe which was scheduled for late
spring. The precise roles of air power in this mighty endeavor were the subject
of extensive and sometimes acrimonious debate. That air power would be
crucial to Allied success. no one doubted.
OVERLORD and Tactical Air Operations in Western
Europe: 1944-1945
Air support for the invasion of France began long before the first Allied
soldiers came ashore at Normandy on June 6, 1944. In the broadest sense, the
objective of the CBO was the progressive destruction of Germany’s capability
and will to wage war so as to, in the words of the plan guiding the CBO, “permit
initiation of final combined operations on the ~ontinent.”’~~ Debilitating the
GAF via Operation POINTBLANK served this purpose by allowing the strategic
air forces to attack other elements of the enemy’s war industries and economy
and by providing command of the air for Allied land and tactical air operations.
More directly, in the months preceding D-day, Allied strategic and tactical air
forces engaged primarily in operations that prepared northwest France for the
invasion.
Planning for tactical air operations imposed new requirements on air
intelligence organizations in the United Kingdom. Until the spring of 1944,
RAF and USAAF intelligence agencies were overwhelmingly concerned either
with the Lujhuffe as a defensive force or with the identification and evaluation
of strategic air targets. Now, support for OVERLORD required information not
only on the GAF in its offensive and ground support roles but also on the
German ground forces and their logistical system. While continuing to fulfill
strategic functions, air intelligence now assumed three additional responsibilities:
assessing the response of the GAF to the invasion; identifying and
monitoring targets for tactical air operations; and providing information,
primarily through photoreconnaissance, for Allied ground forces.
What made the air activity before OVERLORD/NEPTUNE different from
previous amphibious operations was the magnitude of the effort.*’@ American
*OVERLORD was the code name for all the activities involved in the invasion
of western Europe; NEPTUNE referred more narrowly to the crossing of the English
Channel and the landings at Normandy. Allied commands in England tended to use
the term “NEPTUNE” more frequently than the now-common “OVERLORD.”
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