I__. - International Military Testing Association

factors from both enemy and friendly forces, the engineering
modeler intended to deal with the amorphous area of human
factors through a balanced omission: Since neither side showed
human factors, the effect was balanced and should have had no
effect on the tactical or engineering conclusions drawn from the
model's output. In early tactical wargames and engineering
models, this approach was reasonable because the computers of
the day were functional only in aggregated, t‘low resolutiont8
modeling. Low resolution models provided valuable tactical
insights, but little information about specific systems.
Engineering models were also simple: one tank fired at another
in a straightforward duel format.
As wargames became automated, the ability to conduct
high-resolution simulation allowed the tactical and engineering
'modeling of actual systems in dynamic combat. Automation of
wargames also made omission of human factors both unnecessary
and problematic. "Balanced omission" of human factors in
systems development combat models is more accurately described
as the actual modelinq of the human as 100% effective. By
failing to properly consider the human component of systems
performance, the human has an assumed value of 100% effectiveness.
It is generally accepted, even among combat modelers, that
this assumption has the effect of exaggerating systems performance,
and accelerating the tactical pace of a battle.
The two original clients of the combat model, wargarners and
hardware engineers, have had an understandable lack of interest
in representing the human factor component of systems performance
as anything other than 1.0. Human performance parameters
are still much less defined than hardware performance parameters,
and no clear consensus has emerged as to how human factors
should be modeled. The case for improving the representation of
human factors in systems development combat models focuses on
the impact of modeling humans as 100% effective. Notional
systems over-perform and technologies and systems candidates are
eliminated in an occult process long before their interaction
with the human dimension can be measured.
There are additional dimensions to the dilemma of human
factors in combat models. Combat model proponents have a
somewhat justified view of their critics as romantics who wax
philosophically about the value of such human traits as leadership,
morale and courage on the the battlefield, but cannot
quantify these dimensions in order that they be shown as "independent
variables" in the outcome of analytical combat.
A proposed approach for change is outlined in figure 1. A
first step would be to identify the combat models most often
used in the design and selection of systems. While this step
may appear obvious, there could be a drift toward models which
have little impact on systems development, but are easily
modified for human dimensions. systems development models are
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