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I__. - International Military Testing Association

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Table 1<br />

Mean Estimated Number of Valid Derogatory Incidents Reported to Collateral<br />

and SC1 Installation Security Offices During the Past Twelve Months<br />

(Per 1000 Cleared Individuals)<br />

Tvoe of Reoorted Incident<br />

Alcohol abuse 12.1<br />

Other incidents (e.g., non-judicial punishments) 9.5<br />

Drug abuse 6.6<br />

Criminal felony acts not covered in other categories 3.4<br />

Financial problems 3.1<br />

Court martials/desertions 3.1<br />

Falsification of information acts<br />

EmotionaJ/mental/family problems K<br />

Security violation incidents 2:1<br />

Sexual misconduct 1.6<br />

Foreign associations/travel incidents<br />

Disloyalty to the U.S. ::<br />

Collateral SC1<br />

Sites Sites<br />

Note. The samples include 43 collateral sites and 12 SC1 sites.<br />

The results in Table 1 suggest that alcohol abuse and other incidents<br />

(e.g., NJPs) are the most frequently reported areas at both collateral and<br />

SC1 sites. Overall, the average number of reported incidents across all<br />

incident categories (per 1000 cleared individuals) is 46.9 for collateral<br />

sites and 42.3 for SC1 sites.<br />

The CA survey yielded a considerable amount of quantitative and qualitative<br />

data. In addition to the interview data provided by installation security<br />

managers, four types of data were gathered: (1) ratings by installation<br />

security managers, unit security managers, and unit commanders of 136<br />

obstacles in maintaining an effective CA program, (2) write-in responses<br />

(n=684) by these three groups regarding the major CA problems, (3) ratings<br />

by installation security managers of 143 suggestions for improving CA, and<br />

(4) write-in suggestions (n = 636) by installation security managers, unit<br />

security managers, and unit commanders for improving CA.<br />

In order to have a common basis for comparing the quantitative and<br />

qualitative data and to facilitate the interpretation of the survey<br />

results, a taxonomy of CA problem/recommendation (or "finding") areas was<br />

developed. This taxonomy included eight general categories: (1) security<br />

education for cleared personnel; (2) training for security personnel; (3)<br />

derogatory information indicators, sources, and methods; (4) clearance<br />

adjudication procedures; (5) accountability for CA; (6) CA regulations; (7)<br />

CA emphasis; and (8) CA system considerations (e.g., legal issues, number<br />

of cleared personnel).<br />

518<br />

9.3<br />

9.8<br />

3.2<br />

:::<br />

:1<br />

2.8<br />

6.8<br />

2:<br />

.2

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