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Comptes rendus<br />
loaded with food supplies had to be sent to meet thèse starving soldiers on<br />
their return." (p. 159)<br />
In the aftermath of thèse first campaigns, the situation in the steppe<br />
grew potentially more threatening to the Qing, as some Mongols sought to<br />
ally with the Russians. Had large numbers of steppe peoples gone over to<br />
the Russians, or even if the possibility existed of switching allegiances<br />
from the Qing to the Russians and back as interests suggested, Kangxi and<br />
his successors would hâve been plagued by chronic disorder on their<br />
Central Asian frontiers, as well as the possibility that a strong alliance<br />
might émerge against them, perhaps with the Russians at the core. Perdue<br />
argues, convincingly, that the purpose of Qing diplomacy with ail the<br />
players was to assure above ail that the Mongols could not ally with the<br />
Russians. This they did by using trade to lead Moscow to give up its<br />
inclination to make allies of border peoples. As a resuit the "middle" was<br />
excluded, as it is in traditional logic, which makes propositions either true<br />
or false. The Mongols had no choice but to face the Qing, either coming to<br />
terms or being brought to them.<br />
This is an important point. By showing how the potential interaction<br />
of Russia's eastward expansion with Mongol and Tibetan attempts to build<br />
power created the choices Kangxi faced, Perdue intégrâtes three stories:<br />
European, Central Asian, and Chinese. The Qing treaties with Russia, of<br />
Nerchinsk in 1689 and Kiakhta in 1725 made China's march west much<br />
easier.<br />
Hère an interesting counter-factual scénario présents itself. Note that<br />
just fifteen years after Kiakhta the Russians created their settlement at<br />
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, the single most dominating platzdarm in East<br />
Asia, which flanks the Pacific coast of the entire continent. If we imagine<br />
a situation in which the Manchus had not conquered China, but were instead<br />
ensconced in their homeland and at this period threatening to join<br />
with the Russians against some hypothesized power in Beijing, then we<br />
might expect - foliowing Perdue's logic - that the Chinese dynasty would<br />
hâve sought above ail to insulate the Manchus from Russian alliance. That<br />
would hâve meant conquest of the Northeast and a potential check to<br />
Russia's advance to the Pacific. From the point of view of China today,<br />
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