Maart 2013: jaargang 10, nommer 1 - LitNet

LitNet Akademies Jaargang 10 (1), Maart 2013
bestaande teenprestasie bewys kan word, moet in konteks beskou word. 299 Tapper dui baie
duidelik aan dat hierdie reël uit die Engelse aktevervaardigingspraktyk ontstaan het, en dat
daar geen Engelse gesag bestaan wat bepaal dat ekstrinsieke getuienis toelaatbaar is om ’n
egte teenprestasie in ’n akte te bewys nie:
As a matter of conveyancing practice, it became usual to insert a nominal
consideration in many deeds in order to avoid the implication of a use, so it was
reasonable to infer that, so far as the intention of the parties was concerned, these
cases were the same as those in which no consideration was inserted in a deed.
There is no authority dealing with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to vary a
real consideration stated in a deed. 300
In Du Plessis v Nel 301 het appèlregter Van den Heever ook na die reël as uniek aan die
Engelse reg verwys. Zeffertt en Paizes is die volgende mening toegedaan:
That the rule does derive from principles quite foreign to our law has been
submitted by us above; it has been conclusively shown by Van den Heever JA.
That extremely learned judge has stressed that the term “additional consideration”
is derived from English cases in which the extra, oral terms were supplementary
to a nominal consideration which had been mentioned in a written deed for
technical reasons peculiar to the English law. 302
Bogemelde uiteensetting van die Engelse reg stem egter nie ooreen met die posisie in die
Suid-Afrikaanse reg waar teenprestasie nie ’n vereiste vir die totstandkoming van ’n geldige
ooreenkoms is nie. 303 Volgens Zeffertt en Paizes kon appèlregter Centlivres in Avis v
Verseput 304 derhalwe slegs met “consideration” bedoel het “die rede vir”:
The only way to rationalise this, in a South African context, that does not require
consideration in contract, is to assume that his lordship’s reasoning was based on
a semantic shift in the meaning to be attributed to the term “consideration”, that is
to say, to attribute to it the sense of “the reason for”. Otherwise his lordship’s
remarks are difficult, if not impossible to construe. Looked at in this way, his
lordship would seem to have reasoned as follows: A, in order to take over the
business, undertook in writing that V be paid £X. The “additional consideration”
(that is, the reason) why it was agreed that V was only to be paid £X was the fact
that A had promised V a quarter of the profits. In this sense, the “additional
consideration” did not “contradict” the writing. It could be proved precisely
because it was the “consideration” (the reason) why it was agreed that V was to
get £X. 305
Indien hierdie skrywers korrek is, moet die woordkeuse van appèlregter Centlivres gekritiseer
word, aangesien dit tot groot verwarring in die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak aanleiding gegee
het. Indien die regter met “consideration” bedoel het “die rede vir”, kon hy dit tog duidelik so
gestel het deur bloot te verwys na “the reason for”. Daar word egter aan die hand gedoen dat
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