Maart 2013: jaargang 10, nommer 1 - LitNet

LitNet Akademies Jaargang 10 (1), Maart 2013
minderheid, weliswaar) waar die hof – byvoorbeeld as gevolg van politieke druk – nie met
volle oorgawe aan “die transnasionale” gevolg kon gee nie.
Trefwoorde: artikel 232 Grondwet; artikel 233 Grondwet; artikel 39(1) Grondwet; bindende
volkereg; buitelandse reg; generasies van menseregte; globalisering; Grondwet; grondwetlike
vergelykingsarbeid; grondwetlike vertolkingsbepalings; grondwetsvergelyking;
grondwetsvertolking; handves van regte; konstitusionalisme; konstitusionele
demokrasie; Makwanyane-riglyne; migrasie; nasionale konteks; nasionale versoening;
niebindende volkereg; nuwe grondwette; oorplanting; raamwerk-diktum; Savigny-metodes /
kwartet; sosio-ekonomiese regte; transnasionale konteks; transnasionale
kontekstualisering; travaux préparatoires; volkereg; wetsvertolking
Abstract
“Transnational context” in the jurisprudence of the constitutional court of South
Africa: a variation on the theme of constitutional interpretation
This article is a case study of how (and how effectively) the constitutional court in South
Africa has succeeded in accessing a transnational context to aid, and indeed inspire, the
interpretation of the Constitution (and statutes), with accessing a transnational context here
referring both to the use of and reliance on international law and to the practice of
constitutional comparativism. These two dimensions can be looked at and reflected on
simultaneously, but are not to be equated and eventually conflated. It will be shown that the
court has indeed made this mistake, but fortunately with more positive than negative
consequences, and this, paradoxically, has contributed to a better understanding
of transnational access.
The first main section of the article looks at constitutional provisions that authorise, in so
many words, or at least recommend, access to transnational sources as well as the
jurisprudence of the court on the use and application of such provisions. Particular attention
is devoted to three sets of guidelines which the court developed, notably in the epoch-making
case of S v Makwanyane (the “death penalty case”).
The second main part of the article discusses the use of and reliance on international law in
statutory and constitutional interpretation. Special attention is devoted to, among others, the
weal and woe of a significant dictum of the court in Makwanyane stating that international
law helps provide a framework within which all other law must be construed (the so-called
framework dictum). I also draw attention to the underuse of section 233 of the Constitution
which enjoins any court construing the Constitution or legislation to prefer any reasonable
interpretation in conformity with international law to any other interpretation(s) not thus in
conformity. Section 233 is, for all practical purposes, not really invoked.
2