The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
5.134
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The average total mark-up appears to be in the region of 300% for most parts. However, in the case of one part
(MR 7000 52/26), the mark-up was 823%. in July 2004, Thales paid £15.00 per part to Cellular; Thales in turn
sold the same part to Contractor B at a price of £100.00 per part in August 2004; and the M&GS IPT ultimately
paid £123.50 per part in November 2004. It is very difficult to see what, if any, added value was obtained by the
M&GS IPT in paying such a mark-up. Presumably, the comfort that the M&GS IPT thought it was getting was
that it was purchasing the seals from an accredited aviation supplier. The reality, however, appears to be that the
sub-contractors lower down the chain were, in fact, exercising no effective quality control at all.
Avimo Seals – Conclusions
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5.136
Causation
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5.139
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It is a matter of very considerable concern that potentially critical non-conforming parts could have found their
way into an RAF aircraft.
This case highlights three serious questions about the procurement process:
5.135.1 First, the dangers of aviation and other specialist parts being sourced along with general spares. This is
simply not satisfactory. The sourcing of aviation and other safety critical parts should be in the hands of
appropriate specialists. It should not be in the hands of the M&GS IPT;
5.135.2 Second, the importance of ensuring that those contracted to supply aviation parts to the military
prepare proper specifications for their sub-suppliers which spell out: (a) the key criteria; and (b) the fact
that these are ‘controlled’ parts for aviation use; and
5.135.3 Third, the importance of ensuring that those contracted to supply the military with spares and parts
maintain and implement proper and effective quality control systems in relation to their sub-suppliers.
I turn to consider the likelihood of the failure of a fuel seal failure having caused the fire on board XV230 and,
if so, whether it is more likely to have been an FRS or Avimo seal.
In my view, the failure of a fuel coupling is a compelling candidate for the cause of the escape of fuel which
led to the fire in the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. There are eight FRS seals and one Avimo seal located in the
starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay within inches of the Cross-Feed/SCP duct.
As a result of AAR, the elements of the refuel system within both the No. 7 Tank Dry Bays would have been
pressurised and full of fuel shortly before the fire was detected by XV230’s crew. Analysis by QinetiQ for the
BOI showed that a leak of such fuel, ignited by the SCP duct, could initiate the fire within the known timescale.
It will never be possible to determine exactly which of XV230’s couplings it was that leaked. However, the
BOI, supported by the long term-Air Accident Investigation Branch and the US Air Force Safety Centre crash
investigators (see Chapter 3), believe that, if a leaking coupling was the source of fuel, it would probably have
been in close proximity to the point of ignition, i.e. it would have been one of the fuel couplings in the starboard
No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. I agree. This accords with probability and common sense.
I have spent some time examining Nimrod aircraft in various stages of maintenance at RAF Kinloss and Boscombe
Down. Whilst the failure of other fuel couplings located outside the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay remains a
possibility, it is quite apparent to the naked eye that the internal leak paths which fuel from such remote failed
couplings would have to follow to the ignition point in the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay are, for the most part,
tortuous: negotiating numerous structural members and avoiding drain holes. Such obstacle courses make
these alternative sources of fuel appear most unlikely. I consider alternative causation theories below.