The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Switch in strategy for meeting
Chapter 10A – Nimrod Safety Case: The Facts (Phases 1 and 2)
10A.191 At some stage shortly before the Customer Acceptance Conference, there was an important and subtle
switch in strategy by BAE Systems as regards the format of the meeting: a decision was made no longer
to include a detailed review of the baseline reports or the hazard log contents, but only to present the IPT
with a summary. In my view, BAE Systems’ motive for this switch in presentation is not difficult to fathom:
BAE Systems was naturally concerned that the IPT would refuse to sign off the Phase 2 contract if it became
alert to the fact that: (a) so much work remained to be done (as explained further below, BAE Systems were
shaping to leave over 40% of the hazards “Open”, some 30% “Unclassified”, and a large proportion with
vague recommendations of ‘further work’ being required); and (b) the BLSC Reports themselves had not even
been finalised.
What happened at the meeting?
10A.192 The minutes of the meeting, prepared by the Secretary to the meeting, Richard Oldfield, and sent to the IPT
some three weeks later, on or about 21 September 2004, are only a partial record of what took place. Once
again, it is Witness K [BAE Systems]’s contemporaneous manuscript notes which give the full picture.
10A.193 The meeting was opened by Richard Oldfield. He welcomed the Nimrod IPT representatives on behalf of BAE
Systems and explained that the purpose of the meeting was for BAE Systems to present the results of the
work carried out in “completing” Phase 2 of the NSC and to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Nimrod IPT
‘customer’ that “the contractual requirements of PDS Task 06-3409” had been satisfied. Chris Lowe said in
evidence that “It was as much a commercial meeting as a technical meeting”. The minutes only record three
presentations being given by BAE Systems to the IPT representatives on the first day.
Richard Oldfield’s presentation
10A.194 The first was a PowerPoint presentation by Richard Oldfield entitled “NIMROD BASELINE SAFETY CASE –
AIMS, REQUIREMENTS AND STATUS”. It was clearly aimed at giving the impression that the task had, indeed,
been completed. The key slides are reproduced below:
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