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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

108<br />

6. I have concluded that the balance of probabilities favours overflow during Air-to-Air Refuelling<br />

being the most likely source of the fuel which caused the loss of XV230 for four main reasons:<br />

(1) <strong>The</strong> recent evidence of the fault signal for XV235 which shows that fuel found in the<br />

Supplementary Conditioning Pack elbow muff probably originated from No. 1 Tank Cell 4 rear<br />

vent.<br />

(2) <strong>The</strong> recent careful examination of the No. 1 Tank Cell 4 rear vent confirms the Board of Inquiry’s<br />

view that it is a poor design for fuel and could leak when under fuel pressure. On the majority of<br />

occasions, the vent system will simply carry air but during manoeuvres and Air-to-Air Refuelling,<br />

fuel may enter it.<br />

(3) <strong>The</strong> recent evidence of the dye experiments on MRA4 which show the likelihood of fuel tracking<br />

straight back along the fuselage and entering the SCP elbow and No. 7 Tank Dry Bay.<br />

(4) <strong>The</strong> fact that fuel could have emanated from the two sources (the blow-off valve and vent system)<br />

simultaneously during Air-to-Air Refuelling, with both sources ending up in the starboard No. 7<br />

Tank Dry Bay.<br />

7. It is important to note that much of this evidence is new and was not available to the BOI, the AAIB<br />

or the US Air Force Safety Center.<br />

Deployed crew of XV230<br />

8. <strong>The</strong> deployed air and ground crew of XV230 have nothing to reproach themselves for. <strong>The</strong> two<br />

previous incidents of blow-off on XV230 were sensibly dealt with by imposing a limitation of 15,000<br />

pounds on the No. 1 Tank. <strong>The</strong> assumption that there was no threat to the aircraft as a result of<br />

blow-off operating was perfectly reasonable.<br />

Post accident<br />

9. Air-to-Air Refuelling of <strong>Nimrod</strong>s was suspended following an Air-to-Air Refuelling incident on<br />

XV235 in November 2007, and has not been resumed.<br />

Introduction<br />

History of Air-to-Air Refuelling modifications to the <strong>Nimrod</strong> fleet<br />

6.1<br />

It is important to have a clear and detailed understanding of the history of the Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR)<br />

modification to the <strong>Nimrod</strong> fleet. 1<br />

1982: Original AAR modification fitted for Falklands campaign (Mod 700)<br />

6.2<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> MR2 was converted to enable AAR for Operation Corporate (the Falklands campaign) during 1982,<br />

as an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) under Modification (Mod) No. 700. <strong>The</strong> pressing operational<br />

requirement to fit AAR meant that there was insufficient time to ensure that the AAR system design met all the<br />

requirements of Aviation Publication (AvP) 970. 2 <strong>The</strong> modification was conceived, fashioned and installed in a<br />

record 18 days. However, the refuelling hose from the AAR probe to the fuel system passed through the aircraft<br />

cabin requiring the crew to step over it. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> fuel system was originally fitted with blow-off valves in all<br />

but two fuel tanks (the 4A tanks), to ensure that tanks could not be over-pressurised to the point of structural<br />

1 Annex L of the BOI Report contains a summary of the history of AAR which this Chapter expands upon.<br />

2 Subsequently Defence Standard (Def-Stan) 00-970.

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