The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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Causation
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 4 – Cross-Feed/SCP Duct
5.1 The results of the investigation have shown that in spite of the presence of fuel in the pannier bay,
sufficient precautions have now been taken to reduce the possibility of ignition to an absolute minimum.
In fact, the pannier bay on the A.E.W. is probably safer than the bomb bay of Nimrod Mk. 1 and Mk. 2
with its combination of fuel pipes, hydraulic pipes and explosive stores.”
In light of the above, and whilst it must be a matter of conjecture in the absence of any detailed notes of the
discussions that took place at the Acceptance Conferences, it would seem to me to be a reasonable inference
that any ‘acceptance’ of the MR2 design by the MOD was at least in part informed by British Aerospace’s work
in relation to the AEW and its conclusion that there was no necessity for a fire detection or suppression system
in the vicinity of No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. Even if this were not the case, in my view, ‘acceptance’ of the aircraft by
the MOD/RAF does not absolve the Design Authority from fundamental responsibility for the design.
In conclusion, the Cross-Feed/SCP duct represented a clear breach of good design standards and was contrary
to design regulations applicable at the time (1969 and 1979). In particular, the SCP adjunct to the Cross-Feed
duct was a manifest breach of the standards of AvP 970. 82
The Cross-Feed/SCP duct represented a fundamental flaw in the design of the Nimrod aircraft and was the
primary physical cause of the accident.
Responsibility
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83 84 Hawker Siddeley was responsible for the original design flaws in the MR1 and R1. British Aerospace was
responsible for the design flaws in the MR2. As stated above, the ‘acceptance’ of the aircraft by the MOD does
not absolve the Design Authorities from their responsibility for poor design. British Aerospace were responsible
for designing, manufacturing and installing the SCP installation to the Nimrod but failed properly to assess the
risks inherent in its design. BAE Systems’ denial of the breach of the applicable design standards is surprising.
I discuss these issues further in Chapter 6 (in relation to the incorporation of the AAR capability pursuant to
Mod 715) and further in Chapter 11 (when dealing with BAE Systems’ overall approach to the matters raised
by the Review).
82 Subsequently Def-Stan 00-970.
83 Hawker Siddeley became part of British Aerospace on 29 April 1977.
84 British Aerospace became BAE Systems Plc in November 1999 on the merger with Marconi Electronic Systems.
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