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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

‘Partnering’<br />

12.17<br />

12.18<br />

12.19<br />

348<br />

Upgrade/Update Services. Periodically, aircraft require upgrades to introduce new capabilities, or<br />

updates to deal with the obsolescence of components and thus to maintain existing capability. <strong>The</strong><br />

MOD normally contracted with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for design activity to support<br />

these programmes, as well as for the manufacture of new equipment.<br />

Spares. <strong>The</strong> in-service support of an aircraft requires spare parts both for routine, scheduled maintenance<br />

and to rectify defects. Although simple parts might be sourced from approved 2nd or 3rd <br />

tier suppliers,<br />

complex items (which are generally the cost drivers) are either only produced by the OEMs or need to be<br />

qualified by them as being fit for purpose. Equally, the specialised repair of components is often beyond<br />

the capability of third parties without uneconomic investment in facilities and equipment.<br />

Post-Design Services. Post-Design Services (PDS) is a term that covers the technical support for repair<br />

schemes, the design of routine modifications and fault investigation. Although the MOD traditionally had<br />

a limited engineering design capability, and some third parties provided support in this area, the OEM is<br />

normally best placed to handle complex PDS tasks. This is by virtue of its facilities, expertise and experience<br />

in designing major air systems. As the volume of the aircraft support business has reduced, the overheads<br />

associated with maintaining multiple centres of expertise have become increasingly uneconomic.<br />

Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Services. <strong>The</strong> MOD has always carried out a significant amount of<br />

Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) in-house. However, some specialist tasks, such as fatigue lifeextension<br />

programmes or major upgrades, require facilities and skills available to the OEMs, but which<br />

would be too costly to replicate elsewhere. Thus, Industry has always been contracted to undertake a<br />

proportion of the MOD’s MRO.<br />

‘Partnering’ was the term coined by the MOD for its strategy of entering into long term arrangements with<br />

Industry for the support of equipment across the Sea, Land and Air domains. <strong>The</strong>re were two primary stimuli for<br />

the Partnering initiative which began in the late 1990s. First, the cost of supporting MOD aircraft was regarded<br />

as increasingly expensive; this was partly because inflation in the aircraft support sector had for many years<br />

been running at a higher rate than the inflation escalator applied to MOD budgets. Second, with successive<br />

reductions in the size of the RAF, Army Air Corp and Fleet Air Arm, the number of orders for new air systems had<br />

been steadily falling and the UK Defence Industry and major OEMs began to look to offset the loss of new-build<br />

business by providing more in-support services to the military. <strong>The</strong> MOD believed that the UK Defence Industry<br />

should maintain a viable industrial base because otherwise its ability to support existing in-service platforms and<br />

equipment would be jeopardised.<br />

‘Partnering’ was predicated on entering into long term agreements with OEMs for integrated support services<br />

encompassing most, if not all, of the traditional support sub-disciplines. <strong>The</strong> aim was to use the stability inherent<br />

in such arrangements to deliver long-term efficiencies and to incentivise Industry to reduce recurrent costs. By<br />

focusing on overall aircraft or equipment availability as the measure of Industry’s success, OEMs were incentivised<br />

to deliver all aspects of a support solution to time, cost and performance. In addition, it is in Industry’s interests<br />

to seek to improve reliability and availability as well as to tackle the root causes of obsolescence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> MOD continues to hold airworthiness responsibility on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence. Successful<br />

‘partnering’ (and outsourcing generally) is crucially dependent on the MOD acting as an ‘intelligent customer’.<br />

This in turn depends on (a) continued engagement of MOD personnel in the technical decision-making process<br />

and (b) maintaining the necessary in-house expertise in the relevant disciplines. I make Recommendations<br />

regarding this in Chapter 24.<br />

End-to-End (E2E)<br />

12.20<br />

9 <strong>The</strong> ‘End-to-End’ (E2E) initiative was conceived in roughly the same timeframe (the late 1990s) and for similar<br />

reasons. Again, the reduction in numbers of front line aircraft was the stimulus and it was recognised that<br />

there was excess capacity within the combined MOD/Industry facilities. <strong>The</strong> E2E programme began in parallel<br />

with Partnering and was conceived to address the inefficiencies associated with maintaining multiple centres of<br />

excellence for MRO activity, and the conflicting priorities of the various parties undertaking such work.<br />

9 <strong>The</strong> American idiom is ‘Soup to nuts’ (and Lat. ‘ab ovo usque ad mala’).

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