The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Annex B on screen
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I specifically reject the suggestion, made on behalf of BAE Systems, that it was somehow sufficient or fair to the
customer that Witness C [BAE Systems] had put Annex B up on the screen and this was somehow enough to
alert participants to the fact that such a large percentage of hazards had been left “Open” and “Unclassified”,
as suggested e.g. in re-examination during interview by BAE Systems’ lawyer:
“BAE Systems’ Lawyer: … I am referring to the information as to the number of hazards that are
shown open and unclassified, which is what Richard Oldfield’s calculation relates to. Even if those
statistics were not expressly relayed, my question is whether the information on which they are based
was presented to the customer.
MR LOWE: It was, in the form of that table.”
In my view, flashing a long table up on a screen without summarising its contents could not be considered an
‘open and transparent’ way of BAE Systems presenting the results of its work to its customer. Nor, in my view,
did it give the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ representatives present a fair opportunity to grasp the net result of the
table. The BAE Systems representatives should have been quite upfront and told the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ,
fairly and squarely, how many hazards were being left “Open” and how many “Unclassified”.
Example entry – Hazard H54
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It is right to make clear that there was no attempt by BAE Systems to disguise the fact that there were hazards
which had been left “Unclassified”; it was merely the scale of the problem that they were not keen to draw the
customer’s attention to or highlight, in particular, the very high number of “Unclassified” hazards. On Richard
Oldfield’s calculations 56% of the zonal hazards were “Unclassified”, i.e. more than half. It is noteworthy
that the illustrative ‘example’ CASSANDRA entry shown by Witness C [BAE Systems], Hazard H54, was itself
an “Unclassified” hazard, but otherwise an impressive entry to display because it included one of the longest
hazard descriptions (running to 32 lines), contributions from four separate departments, and references to 13
photographs of the zone in question (Zone 127). The Pro-Forma for Hazard H54 also contained two full pages
of ‘analysis’ which included 17 repetitions of “From in-service data the potential for fuel/hydraulic pipe/bleed air
duct leakage is Improbable”. 38
Motive - embarrassment and desire to avoid arguments
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I am driven to the regrettable conclusion that Richard Oldfield and his senior BAE Systems’ colleagues, Chris Lowe
and Eric Prince, deliberately kept quiet about precisely how many hazards remained “Open” and “Unclassified”
and hoped the customer would not ask any awkward questions. Their motive was obvious: the precise figures
were embarrassing and might give rise to arguments with the Nimrod IPT about whether the task had been
satisfactorily completed. Moreover, the figures did not sit well with the positive impression created by the
presentations. It is unfortunate that the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ did not ask some intelligent questions.
Not tolerable
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The fact that the Nimrod IPT had not been told the full picture at the meeting was put in interview to BAE
Systems’ Engineering Integration Manager at the time, Witness B [BAE Systems]. 39 His reaction in interview to
being told the full picture was instructive:
38 The author was Witness R [BAE Systems] and the counter signatory Eric Prince, both on 2 August 2004.
39 Witness B [BAE Systems] was Richard Oldfield’s line manager and reported to the TTRO Chief Engineer. He had Nimrod MR2 and R Mk1 delegated
Design Signatory approval but had little or no active role in the NSC, the management of which was entirely delegated to Richard Oldfield. His
signature on the BLSC Reports was merely to ensure compliance with Design Engineering procedure DE101 and did not relate to technical content.
In my view, he had no material responsibility for the outcome of the NSC.
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