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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> Process<br />

15.32<br />

15.33<br />

Chapter 15 – BOI Recommendations and Post-XV230 Events and Measures<br />

In an attempt to address the above issues, BAE Systems suggested that advantage could be taken of an updated<br />

version of CASSANDRA, which permitted the separation of individual causes and their mitigations. This proposal<br />

was accepted by the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT and a revised draft Pro-Forma was produced taking advantage of this facility.<br />

Work on the new drafts was further prioritised to a sub-set of four of the 11 priority zones. <strong>The</strong> initial versions<br />

of the new Pro-Formas were approximately four to five pages long. <strong>The</strong> intention was that, as the draft Pro-<br />

Formas were produced, they would be circulated for comment among the stakeholder group and a final version<br />

produced, suitable for publication. Further, advice was provided from the front line engineers at RAF Kinloss as<br />

to their subjective assessment of the probability of some of the identified hazards.<br />

<strong>The</strong> minutes of the meeting on 13 March 2008 record the aspiration to have the selected four of the 11 priority<br />

zones completed in draft form and passed to the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT by 21 March 2008. By December 2008, this had<br />

still not happened.<br />

Lack of Progress<br />

15.34<br />

Two further SC2 meetings were held in April and May 2008, but the revised Pro-Formas were still not available<br />

for review outside BAE Systems Chadderton. In April 2008, it was proposed by BAE Systems that an ‘on aircraft<br />

assessment’ should be added to the process and that it was possible that new ‘causes’ might be found which<br />

were not identified in the original NSC. Difficulties were encountered in separating out individual causes and,<br />

on 21 May 2008, the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT agreed to allow BAE Systems to treat any emergent causes as new, additional<br />

work under separate tasking, i.e. the price continued to rise. It was also noted at the meeting on 21 May 2008<br />

that the Pro-Forma for Hazard H44 was 80% complete and that for Hazard H73 (No. 7 Tank Dry Bay) 85%<br />

complete.<br />

15.35 By 2 July 2008, a review of ‘causes’ for the 11 priority zones was “ still ongoing and dates have yet to be finalised<br />

for the on aircraft visit”. At a ‘senior stakeholder review’, including the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT Leader (IPTL), on 15 July<br />

2008, it was agreed that the maintained condition of the aircraft would be recognised during the zonal surveys,<br />

in addition to the original ‘as designed’ condition. A programme ‘end date’ of December 2008 was announced<br />

and agreed.<br />

Extraordinary review<br />

15.36<br />

15.37<br />

By December 2008, none of the draft Pro-Formas had reached any of the other parties involved and an<br />

extraordinary review meeting was arranged at BAE Systems Chadderton. <strong>The</strong> representation was at a senior<br />

level and included the IPTL and BAE Systems’ Chief Engineer for the <strong>Nimrod</strong>, Martin Breakell. Early in the<br />

agenda, and notwithstanding the comprehensive manner in which the original NSC had been restructured<br />

throughout 2008, it was re-affirmed that the review of the NSC was in fact a ‘periodic review’ which would<br />

have taken place in any event five years after the original NSC was produced. A new target date of end of March<br />

2009 was agreed by the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT.<br />

<strong>The</strong> December 2008 meeting also involved a review of the progress made in respect of both the functional<br />

and zonal hazard Pro-Formas. By this time, the on-aircraft inspections of zones had commenced and work was<br />

progressing in relation to other zones in addition to the original 11 high priority ones. Of the 202 functional<br />

hazards, 55 Pro-Formas were presented as 80% complete and 17 were between 50 – 80% complete. It was<br />

noted by a BAE Systems attendee that, as a ‘sanity check’ of progress, this represented only one third of the total<br />

of functional hazards since the beginning of the project. He was clearly referring here to the fact that completion<br />

of only 30% of the total number of functional hazards since May 2008 (this 30% being at best 80% complete)<br />

did not bode well for meeting the March 2009 deadline. Zonal hazards were presented as having been tackled<br />

in several different packages. Package 1 was 85% complete and Package 2a had all causes complete to 65%. It<br />

would appear that Hazards H44 and H73 had not advanced very far since their designation in May as 80/85%<br />

complete respectively. <strong>The</strong> summary slide noted “High Risk Zones will be complete in March 2009” and May<br />

2009 was the predicted overall completion date.<br />

423

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