The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
95 96
11.161 In 2008, BAE Systems also engaged Praxis High Integrity Systems (Praxis) to review the Baker and Columbia
Reports for BAE Systems Military Air Solutions (MAS). 97 Praxis said that the safety culture within MAS was ‘very
strong’ and a defence to problems such as safety workload from ‘overly aggressive delivery milestones’ and
ensuring ‘due process is followed’. 98 The story of the NSC would suggest that the safety culture in MAS may
not be as strong or uniform as thought. Praxis warned that challenges lay ahead “as MAS operates over more
sites and with varied staff backgrounds such as ex-RAF staff”. 99 It drew the following parallels:
“Both Baker and Columbia reports focus heavily on the cultural issues leading to the
accidents. NASA had a strong culture which declined over time under re-organisation,
outsourcing and cost pressure. BP suffered from very different safety cultures at different
sites. BAE Systems currently has a strong safety culture, but is diversifying and changing,
e.g. multiple sites. Therefore nature of the business, the lack of cultural measurement
and the importance of the safety culture are key parallels with Baker and Columbia
reports.” 100
11.162 In my view, the above gives rise to a concern that BAE Systems has failed to implement its expressed ethical
business culture company-wide. The responsibility for this must lie with the leadership of the Company.
Criticisms of BAE Systems’ personnel
11.163 The key BAE Systems’ personnel involved in the NSC in 2001-2005 were those at management level, Chris
Lowe, Richard Oldfield, and Eric Prince. They bear primary responsibility for the catalogue of failures by BAE
Systems in relation to the NSC.
11.164 The respective personal responsibilities of Chris Lowe, Richard Oldfield and Eric Prince for the NSC must be
judged against a background of a busy office and increasingly heavy workloads for each of them given their
numerous other duties and, e.g., the increasing demands for technical support for the Afghanistan and Iraq
conflicts. It is also fair to say that the NSC was one of the first major Safety Cases to be drawn up for legacy
platforms and, therefore, there was inevitably a learning curve for each of them. In my judgment, however,
the conduct of all three individuals fell substantially below what could reasonably have been expected from
professionals in their respective positions with their respective responsibilities and they should, therefore, be
named and held accountable.
Chris Lowe - BAE Systems’ Chief Airworthiness Engineer
11.165 Chris Lowe was BAE Systems’ Chief Airworthiness Engineer at the time. He was responsible: (a) for Airworthiness
governance for the work undertaken at Chadderton by the Nimrod MR2 and R1 team; (b) as Functional Head
of Safety Engineering; and (c) for leadership of the Airworthiness Department and supervision of Airworthiness
staff. He played a key role in the NSC between 2001 and 2005. He was heavily involved in the preparation of
the major NSC documents, including in particular, the Feasibility Study (March 2002), the Preliminary Hazard
Identification Report (April 2003), Phase 2 Proposal (November 2003), Phase 2 Certification Statement (June
2004), Fire & Explosion Report (August 2004), Nimrod MR2 and R1 Equipment Safety Case Baseline Reports
(September 2004). He facilitated the FTA workshop (November 2002) and played a leading role at the Customer
Acceptance Conference (31 August-1 September 2004) and the Fifth and Sixth PSWG meetings (18 May and
10 November 2004). He had done an MSc in Safety Engineering at Lancaster University which had included a
dissertation on aircraft fire and explosion in aircraft in 2003. 101
95 The Report of the US BP Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, January 2008 (the Baker Report).
96 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, August 2003 (CAIB Report). See further Chapter 17.
97 Independent Review of the Baker and Columbia Reports, April 2008 (the Praxis Report).
98 Ibid, paragraph 6.3.1.
99 Ibid, paragraph 6.3.1.
100 Ibid, paragraph 6.3.2.
101 “A Review of the Overall Fire/Explosion Risk in Commercial Transport Airframe Design Operation”, Author Christopher Lowe, Lancaster University
Engineering Department, 2003.
303