The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
482
operational tempo. In addition, Commanders felt constrained by contractual base support over
which they have little or no control.” (paragraph 3).
19.34.5 “HQ/Gp/Station Relationships. The roles and responsibilities of [Group/Joint Helicopter
Command, [Force Head Quarters] Station/Squadron Executives and STANEVALs] are unclear to
many across the [Force Elements] and the rustication of some [Group] functions has exacerbated
the problem. In addition, this lack of clear understanding has resulted in units developing nonstandardised
processes even within the same Force Elements. The end result of the rustication of
HQ and Group functions has been viewed as a general increase in station workloads without any
appreciable increase in manpower.” (paragraph 4).
19.34.6 “Impact of Engineering Force Cuts. ...Progressive cuts in engineering unit manning had an
increasingly detrimental effect on engineering capability to the point of failure; this was especially
true in cuts made to depth engineering. Some of the fleets interviewed were using two shifts
worth of technicians and mechanics spread over a three-shift pattern with an attendant risk
of errors and omissions being made validated by increases in the number of snags reported
during walk-rounds. Engineering personnel on all sites also reported, albeit cautiously, that
maintenance often follows the ‘quick way’ rather than the ‘right way’ (ie not in accordance with
the Maintenance Instructions) in an effort to get the job completed in time. Although there are
many safe systems of work in place across the engineering and related trades, it is clear that short
cuts continue to be taken in order to meet the task. Whereas the depth of experience in the
past would have allowed considered risk-based judgements to be made, risk aversion coupled
with less experienced crew paradoxically could raise the probability of failure or unnecessary
delays. Coupled with [......] ageing platforms and high rates of tasking, considerable risk is being
accumulated, increasing the likelihood – and severity – of major failure.” (paragraph 6).
19.34.7 “Operations and Engineering. Several of the stations used ad-hoc organisational structures to
interface operations and engineering. This translated into a generally poor interaction and lack
of understanding of both operational needs and engineering capacity. Some of the units visited
were limited in the development of near or long term flying programmes as the engineers could
barely generate enough aircraft to meet bare minimum flying rates, compounding the planning
problem. [...]” (paragraph 7).
19.34.8 “IPT and Industry Support. Many of the stations reported that for varied reasons industrial
support was, at times, not achieving headline or contracted rates of delivery of airframes or
equipment. ... Engineering officers also reported confusing relationships with their IPTs and
Group interfaces in being able to manage the force.” (paragraph 8).
19.34.9 ”Delivery of qualified personnel. Each of the units sampled relayed problems with getting
adequate numbers of qualified personnel in the right positions. This stemmed from a range of
issues, including a lack of qualified personnel, training backlogs in OCUs and formal courses, new
training systems, and poor management of personnel. There was the sense that the numbers
of personnel, rather than their skills and experience, determined placement. The typical practice
of posting personnel on promotion, often to a different platform, can result in substantial loss
of skills and experience... The net result is a growing experience gap [......] .... Some Forces are
already facing the prospect of not having enough experience personnel to man their OCU and
STANEVAL functions. ...” (paragraph 9).
19.34.10 ”Training Standards. ... the sparse availability of platforms, coupled with a shortage of qualified
instructors means that aircrew conversion training is sporadic and characterised by cancelled
sorties and lack of opportunity to consolidate skills... Changes in engineering training structures
such as multiskilling technicians are reported to have made little changes in rates of delivery, as
most would feel uncomfortable in their second trade and they do not have time to consolidate
their training. This problem is aggravated by the absence of a ‘Training Margin’ to provide staff/
manning cover when personnel undertake additional training. ...” (paragraph 11).