The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 10A – Nimrod Safety Case: The Facts (Phases 1 and 2)
10A.101 It appears, however, that QinetiQ was not furnished with a copy of the Nimrod SMP. The reasons why not
are not altogether clear. It is not clear what formal requests were made by QinetiQ for a copy. It appears
Martyn Mahy remained unclear whether an SMP had been completed. This is unfortunate because it was
difficult to see how QinetiQ could properly perform its task (Task 010) of advising the Nimrod IPT on its Safety
Management System (SMS), including the NSC, without a copy of the Nimrod SMP. A copy was not provided
by the Nimrod IPT to QinetiQ until November 2007, prompting the following (sarcastic) internal e-mail at
QinetiQ: “It’s a miracle!! After years of asking for it, the IPT have just sent us a copy of the Nimrod R1/MR2
Safety Management Plan!!”.
Subsequent meeting to ‘clarify and defuse tensions’ (9 March 2004)
10A.102 QinetiQ was anxious to remain on good relations with the Nimrod IPT and not to lose business. Accordingly,
at QinetiQ’s request, a meeting to ‘clarify and defuse tensions’ subsequently took place with the Nimrod IPT
on 9 March 2004. Present for QinetiQ were Martyn Mahy, Witness M [QinetiQ], Witness N [QinetiQ], and
Colin Blagrove. Present for the Nimrod IPT were George Baber, Michael Eagles and Frank Walsh. The minutes
record George Baber requiring “an essential change to the QQ reports” because QinetiQ were “not currently
offering advice that he felt was needed” or “value for money”. QinetiQ appear to have acknowledged what
may have been seen as over-zealous advice in the past by Witness L [QinetiQ] on a ‘tie-wraps’ issue but
explained that he had left the company. The minutes also record QinetiQ suggesting that it would be better
if QinetiQ were brought in early because “a teamed approach would improve the safety case”, QinetiQ could
assist and advise and provide ‘route maps’ for safety which “should be approved quickly”. The meeting seems
to have been successful in smoothing things over. Witness L [QinetiQ] said that QinetiQ’s Project Managers
went to “extraordinary lengths” to keep their IPTLs happy and were, on occasions, prepared to modify their
position. It is clear that the Nimrod IPT continued to view QinetiQ with some scepticism and QinetiQ were
certainly eager to please.
QinetiQ’s advice on LBI’s rejected as ‘gold-plated’
10A.103 Martyn Mahy was subsequently tasked to re-write the Nimrod IPT’s Local Business Instructions (LBIs) for the
safety cases for modifications to the Nimrod fleet. Martyn Mahy regarded them as deficient and made a
number of comments and recommendations. His advice was, in the main, rejected by Frank Walsh and the
Nimrod IPT on the basis that QinetiQ was advocating a depth of investigation that was “out of proportion”
to the task. The final paragraph of Frank Walsh’s e-mail response on this topic, dated 28 May 2004, gives an
indication of the mind-set of the Nimrod IPT at the time:
“In conclusion, the Nimrod fleet has a proven safety record, taking into account the fleet
flying hours against the number of accidents, of 1x10 -5 and, as 2 of the accidents were
not caused by equipment failure, it can therefore be argued to be even safer in practice.
The remit of the IPT is to operate, maintain and modify the aircraft to ALARP principles
and that includes the time, cost and effort needed to staff any changes. We appreciate
the time and effort that you have put in to reviewing our processes and will take forward
many of your recommendations. However, we consider that to follow your full guidance
would produce a “gold plated” solution that does not meet the ALARP principle and
would not represent value for money.” (emphasis added)
10A.104 Martyn Mahy expressed his concern at Frank Walsh’s response in an internal e-mail to his superior, Colin
Blagrove, on 3 June 2004. He said that it was the Nimrod IPT’s right to reject his recommendations but it must
be aware of “the implications of not providing sufficient identification and risk mitigation of hazards”. As
regards the NSC itself, he said that much would depend on his “examination” of the BLSC on 17 June 2004:
“The IPT want to ensure that [there] will be no surprises when we all come to review and (hopefully) sign-off
the Baseline Safety Case in July”. His e-mail concluded, presciently: “My fear is that we may find the safety
case inadequate, with no time left for BAE to correct it within the project timescales. Then again, maybe I
should be more optimistic (not easy for an objective Safety Eng!).” Frank Walsh stated in interview that he
regarded QinetiQ’s approach to the LBIs as “over the top”.
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