The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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Richard Oldfield had made a mistake when drawing up the minutes and should have used the term “internal
review” which appeared in his own manuscript notes of the meeting. If this were indeed the case, then it points
to Richard Oldfield exaggerating the significance of the review for the purpose of the minutes. I reject BAE
Systems’ alternative argument that, because the item appeared under “Any Other Business” in the minutes, it
should not be regarded as particularly important.
11.99 In my view, either Chris Lowe or Richard Oldfield exaggerated the significance of the internal “independent
review” in order to give comfort to the customer. It was a requirement of JSP553 and Def-Stan 00-56 that an
‘Independent Safety Auditor’ (ISA) be appointed to audit documents such as the NSC which raised Class A and B
risks. 40 In fact, QinetiQ was acting as ‘independent advisor’ to the Nimrod IPT but was never formally appointed
as ISA and never carried out an audit of the NSC. It was technically permissable for BAE Systems to have carried
out its own “independent review”. 41
(15) BAE Systems’ BLSC Reports gave the impression to the cursory reader that the
aircraft could be “deemed acceptably safe to operate” without substantial further
work.
11.100 In my judgment, BAE Systems’ BLSC Reports gave an unfortunate unqualified impression that the aircraft could
be “deemed acceptably safe to operate” without substantial further work.
11.101 Although the Executive Summaries of the BLSC Reports contained express references to Annexes B and C and
the number of hazards remaining open “(qty 43)”, they concluded with the following, apparently unqualified,
eye-catching statement (partly in bold):
“From the above, it is thus declared that all potential hazards have been identified, assessed
and addressed and that all appropriate standards had been met. Accepting this the top
level goal of the Nimrod MR Mk2 type Equipment Safety Case that “The aircraft type is
deemed acceptably safe to operate and maintain within specified contexts” has
been demonstrated as having been achieved.”
11.102 BAE Systems submitted that this was merely ‘ awkward writing’ and that the BLSC Reports were not, as a whole,
misleading. It is true that (even) a moderately careful reading of the BLSC Reports would and should have elicited
the correct picture. But it is troubling that the wording was be framed in such a way as potentially to mislead
the incautious, or busy, reader who might have occasion merely to glance at the end of Executive Summary. This
would have served to have reinforced the impression given at the Customer Acceptance Conference.
‘Blurb’ and the ‘thud factor’
11.103 In my view, much of the documentation produced by BAE Systems in respect of the NSC contained a great
deal of what might politely be described as ‘padding’ or “blurb”. 42 Like so many consultants’ reports, this was
designed to give the client the impression that he was getting a substantial piece of analysis. This is sometimes
known in the consultant trade as the ‘thud’ factor: clients are thought to be more impressed when ‘weighty’
consultants reports land on their desks and feel they are getting ‘value for money’. The BAE Systems reports
contained much unnecessary repetition. For instance, pages on Safety Case ‘strategy’ and Goal Structured
Notation (GSN) are lifted from the Phase 1 Proposal and repeated in the BLSC Reports, adding little value but
length to the latter and making them less digestible.
40 See JSP553, Chapter 2, paragraph 2.58 and Def-Stan 00-56, paragraph 5.3.4.
41 Although Def-Stan 00-56, paragraph 5.3.4.4 provides that: “Where, exceptionally, it is necessary for the Independent Safety Auditor to belong
to a company that is part of the same trading group as the Contract, the proposed arrangement shall be justified and shall be agreed with the
MOD PM.”
42 “Blurb” was the term coined by Witness R [BAE Systems] in a draft Pro-Forma (Hazard H80) which he had completed and was passing on to a
colleague in Electrics for further work.