The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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The Nimrod Review 10A.71 10A.72 206 Whilst the BAE Systems personnel carrying out the zonal inspections of Zones 514 and 614 identified the general risk presented in the No. 7 Tank Dry Bay starboard resulting from the proximity of fuel pipes and the hot bleed-air piping, they did not particularly highlight the special fire risk represented by the SCP. However, since the task which they appear to have engaged in at this stage was essentially a brief zonal inspection rather than a zonal analysis itself, this is perhaps not altogether surprising. In my view, if they had carried out a detailed and careful zonal inspection and analysis while on site, the serious fire risk that the SCP represented would and should have become apparent. I have concluded, however, that, since the individuals who carried out the zonal inspections were not instructed or expected to do more than record the bare details on the worksheets, it would be unfair to criticise them. The real problem was that the whole approach to the ZHA in Phase 1 was fundamentally flawed: it comprised inspection but no analysis on site. ‘Initial probabilities’ ascribed 10A.73 Each hazard was ascribed an “initial probability”, i.e. an initial risk estimate. The “initial probability” ascribed to each of Hazards H367 and H498 was different, notwithstanding that they related to the same zone and essentially the same hazard. The initial probability ascribed to Hazard H367 was “Improbable”, whereas the initial probability ascribed to Hazard H498 was “Remote”. This was a difference of one order of magnitude, i.e. 10-5-10-6 compared with 10-6-10-7 . This made a significant difference under the Hazard Risk Index table (HRI) 50 : “Improbable” equated to “Tolerable” under the HRI, whereas “Remote” equated to “Undesirable”. It appears that the process of initial probability categorisation was fairly rudimentary. Witness C [BAE Systems] said he or his partner would have categorised Hazard H367 as “Improbable” having conducted a word search on the incident database to see if there was any evidence of leaks in that zone. Witness I [BAE Systems] said that he or his partner would have categorised Hazard H498 as “Remote” using engineering judgment and because of the “significant number of interactive systems” in the zone. These initial probabilities were entered on the CASSANDRA database. (It should be noted that these initial probabilities subsequently proved to be significant because they were in due course seen by the Nimrod Safety Manager, Frank Walsh, when he came to interrogate the database and, it would appear, used by him to sentence many of the remaining risks). Zonal risk from No. 1 blow-off valve 10A.74 Photographs 10A.75 10A.76 50 BP1201 The zonal risk represented by a fuel blow-off during refuelling from No. 1 blow-off valve was not identified during the ZHA. BAE Systems said that the outside of the fuselage was not considered to be a ‘zone’ and, accordingly, no specific zonal analysis was done on this area on the starboard side forward of the No. 7 Tank Dry Bay starboard. I discuss later in Chapter 11 whether this approach was, in fact, justifiable. Photographs were taken of zones during Phase 1 which were available to those carrying out the later Phase 2 hazard analysis. The problem was that these photographs were often difficult to follow and poorly labelled. The two jpg photographs referred to in the CASSANDRA log entries for Hazards H367 and H498 are reproduced below as Figure 10A.1. They are, however, not particularly informative or easy to follow. Apart from showing a ‘spaghetti junction’ of different systems in close proximity, they show little else. They give little idea of the angle from which they are taken. In interview, even Witness I [BAE Systems] (who took part in the original zonal inspection of the dry bays) initially thought when questioned by the Review that they were taken from above when, in fact, they were both taken from below looking directly up.
DCP 0221.jpg DCP 0312.jpg Chapter 10A – Nimrod Safety Case: The Facts (Phases 1 and 2) Figure 10A.1: Photographs referred to in the CASSANDRA log entries for Hazards H367 and H498 207
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THE NIMROD REVIEW An independent re
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© Crown Copyright 2009 The text in
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THE LOSS OF RAF NIMROD XV230 A FAIL
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XV230
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2 The Nimrod Review Section Two: Re
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Summar
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The Nimrod Review Offices and Team
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Executive Summary Introduction Loss
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Summar
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Coroner’s Inquest Chapter 1 - Int
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Chapter 2 - History of the Nimrod A
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2.8 2.9 Chapter 2 - History of the
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Nimrod 2000/MRA4 2.23 2.24 Chapter
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2.37 Chapter 2 - History of the Nim
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2.45 2.46 Chapter 2 - History of th
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CHAPTER 3 - THE BOARD OF INQUIRY RE
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Chapter 3 - The Board of Inquiry Re
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Chapter 3 - The Board of Inquiry Re
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3.22 Chapter 3 - The Board of Inqui
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PART II: PHYSICAL CAUSES
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The Nimrod Review 36 (2) The escape
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The Nimrod Review 38 because Nimrod
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The Nimrod Review 40 7. The Cross-F
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The Nimrod Review 42 Addition of SC
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The Nimrod Review 44 No. 7 Tank Dry
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The Nimrod Review 46 4.17 4.18 Tria
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The Nimrod Review 48 4.24 Figure 4.
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The Nimrod Review 50 Shrouds 4.32 b
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The Nimrod Review 52 4.36 This conf
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The Nimrod Review 54 4.42 Gaps 4.43
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The Nimrod Review 56 (3) Inadequate
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The Nimrod Review 58 (1) Breach of
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The Nimrod Review 60 4.64 4.65 4.66
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The Nimrod Review 62 4.72 4.73 haza
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The Nimrod Review 64
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The Nimrod Review 66 Prevailing App
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The Nimrod Review 68 18. Targeted f
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The Nimrod Review 70 Figure 5.3: Ni
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The Nimrod Review 72 Description of
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The Nimrod Review 74 Figure 5.8: Fu
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The Nimrod Review 76 5.17 determine
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The Nimrod Review 78 5.27 to have b
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The Nimrod Review 80 of one second,
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The Nimrod Review 82 Maintenance re
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The Nimrod Review 84 Ignition/Leak
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The Nimrod Review 86 Fuselage Leaks
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The Nimrod Review 88 would generate
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The Nimrod Review 90 5.75 5.76 5.77
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The Nimrod Review 92 The Manufactur
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The Nimrod Review 94 The Procuremen
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The Nimrod Review 96 Contractual ch
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The Nimrod Review 98 5.111 Comment
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The Nimrod Review 5.123 5.124 5.125
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The Nimrod Review 5.134 102 The ave
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The Nimrod Review 108 6. I have con
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The Nimrod Review 6.6 110 this inta
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The Nimrod Review Analysis 6.19 112
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The Nimrod Review 6.28 114 limitati
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The Nimrod Review 6.40 116 Impingem
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The Nimrod Review 6.44 6.45 118 The
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The Nimrod Review Gap between fairi
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The Nimrod Review 6.60 6.61 6.62 6.
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The Nimrod Review 6.72 Cognisant of
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The Nimrod Review 6.83 126 on its o
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The Nimrod Review 6.96 128 I have c
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The Nimrod Review Causation general
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The Nimrod Review 6.113 132 of fuel
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The Nimrod Review 134 Causation 9.
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The Nimrod Review 7.10 136 Followin
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The Nimrod Review 7.20 138 When XV2
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The Nimrod Review 7.39 142 combinat
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The Nimrod Review 7.47 Causation 14
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The Nimrod Review 7.53 Dealing with
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The Nimrod Review 7.67 Conclusion 1
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The Nimrod Review Introduction 8.1
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Page 165 and 166: PART III: NIMROD SAFETY CASE Introd
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Page 197 and 198: Chronology - three phases 10A.8 Cha
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Page 207 and 208: Worksheets 10A.60 10A.61 10A.62 Cha
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10B.75 10B.76 “Change 17 Mar 2005
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Chapter 11 - Nimrod Safety Case: An
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Criticism of individuals Chapter 11
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Introduction Background - Chapters
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(2) BAE Systems failed to carry out
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Sketchy details and inadequate phot
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Delays resulted 11.51 Chapter 11 -
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11.61 Chapter 11 - Nimrod Safety Ca
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Primary sentencing source was MRA4
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Purpose of meeting 11.77 Dilemma 11
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11.85 11.86 Chapter 11 - Nimrod Saf
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Ethics 11.95 Causation 11.96 Chapte
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Review’s audit of the Pro-Formas
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(3) Erroneous or poor mitigation an
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‘Zone 7.23’ Chapter 11 - Nimrod
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(3) Leaving the NSC task incomplete
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Detailed analysis and criticisms of
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Joint working group never set up Ch
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George Baber’s lack of care and a
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(8) QinetiQ was too compliant and e
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Failure to ask intelligent question
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PART IV: ORGANISATIONAL CAUSES
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The Nimrod Review 342 6.2 1994-1999
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The Nimrod Review 344 Figure 12.2:
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The Nimrod Review 12.9 IPTs 346
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The Nimrod Review ‘Partnering’
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The Nimrod Review 2007: formation o
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The Nimrod Review 356 ‘change’
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The Nimrod Review 358 (2) Demise of
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The Nimrod Review 13.4 13.5 13.6 13
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The Nimrod Review 13.14 362 In my v
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The Nimrod Review 13.23 De-layering
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The Nimrod Review McKinsey recommen
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The Nimrod Review 13.44 ‘CUTS’
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The Nimrod Review 13.54 370 13.53.1
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The Nimrod Review 372 or organisati
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The Nimrod Review ‘Reduction in o
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The Nimrod Review 13.83 376 lines (
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The Nimrod Review (2) Increased ope
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The Nimrod Review Realpolitik 13.10
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The Nimrod Review DLO Business Plan
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The Nimrod Review Chief Engineer RA
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The Nimrod Review 13.126 AD(Eng)Pol
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The Nimrod Review 388 D Tech AD(Eng
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The Nimrod Review Conclusion on MOD
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The Nimrod Review 13.148 392 apex,
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The Nimrod Review 13.158 394 (4) Fe
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The Nimrod Review 13.169 396 with A
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The Nimrod Review Evidence of Nimro
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The Nimrod Review 13.188 13.189 Con
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The Nimrod Review 402 5. The immedi
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The Nimrod Review 2003: ISD ‘slip
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The Nimrod Review 14.16 14.17 406 F
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The Nimrod Review 14.25 408 forces
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The Nimrod Review Conclusion 14.30
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PART V: AFTERMATH Introduction to P
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Chapter 15 - BOI Recommendations an
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15.8 Chapter 15 - BOI Recommendatio
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Fuel Seal Replacement Programme 15.
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The Process 15.32 15.33 Chapter 15
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The Cost 15.44 15.45 Chapter 15 - B
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Appendix A to Chapter 15 AIRCRAFT:
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Serial Recommendations Status Numbe
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CHAPTER 16 - INQUEST Contents Chapt
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Chapter 16 - Inquest 16.4.2 Second,
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PART VI: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATION
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The Nimrod Review 446 (7) A new Pro
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The Nimrod Review NASA Space Shuttl
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The Nimrod Review (2) ‘Torrent of
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The Nimrod Review (10) ‘Normalisa
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The Nimrod Review 454 who are gover
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The Nimrod Review 456 17.39.3 “It
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The Nimrod Review 462 The three yea
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The Nimrod Review 466 ‘Bow Tie’
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The Nimrod Review The ‘organisati
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The Nimrod Review 18.38 470 1 Accid
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The Nimrod Review Current position
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The Nimrod Review (6) There is a bi
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The Nimrod Review 476 by the IPT an
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The Nimrod Review 478 trails’ rat
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The Nimrod Review 480 Meeting / Wor
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The Nimrod Review 482 operational t
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The Nimrod Review 484 19.34.16 ”A
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The Nimrod Review Four Key Principl
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The Nimrod Review 20.12 20.13 490 1
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The Nimrod Review 20.24 20.25 492 S
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The Nimrod Review 494 (8) Mandatory
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The Nimrod Review 496 I. Clarificat
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The Nimrod Review 498 issues person
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The Nimrod Review 500 Recommendatio
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The Nimrod Review 502 Head of the M
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The Nimrod Review 504 Defence Airs
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The Nimrod Review 506 those who are
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The Nimrod Review 21.37 Paragraph 6
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MAA The Nimrod Review Head of the M
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The Nimrod Review 512 will also mai
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The Nimrod Review 21.59 21.60 Objec
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The Nimrod Review 21.80 21.81 Objec
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The Nimrod Review 520 Recommendatio
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The Nimrod Review Recommendations E
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The Nimrod Review 21.110 524 The BO
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The Nimrod Review 21.119 526 in a p
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The Nimrod Review 21.129 21.130 Obj
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The Nimrod Review 530 provide overs
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The Nimrod Review 21.152 532 nd I w
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The Nimrod Review 22.12 Third, Safe
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The Nimrod Review 538 22.16.1 First
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The Nimrod Review Genesis of Safety
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The Nimrod Review Six Principles fo
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The Nimrod Review 546 (2) Common se
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The Nimrod Review Life Extension Pr
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The Nimrod Review 554 not represent
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The Nimrod Review 23.35 556 I consu
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The Nimrod Review Lesson Learned -
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The Nimrod Review 24.12 562 nor per
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The Nimrod Review Conclusions 25.16
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The Nimrod Review Professor Reason
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The Nimrod Review Safety Managers 2
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The Nimrod Review The critical role
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The Nimrod Review 29.6 XV230 29.7 5
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The Nimrod Review FI Fatigue Index
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Acknowledgements A
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