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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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Phase 2 of DLO re-structuring programme: 2005<br />

13.39<br />

<strong>The</strong> MOD Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05 stated:<br />

Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)<br />

“<strong>The</strong> DLO completed Phase 1 of its Restructuring programme in 2004-05. This established<br />

the DLO’s new corporate structure, realising around 700 post savings and reducing the<br />

cost of corporate support substantially. It has transformed the delivery of corporate support<br />

by dismantling the previous structure of 5 individual High Level Budget areas, including<br />

the headquarters, and establishing a single corporate approach. At the same time the<br />

Integrated Project Teams and other units delivering output to the DLO’s customers were<br />

organised into clusters to provide effective and coherent management of a technology<br />

supplier or customer base. A radically different organisational structure has now been<br />

created based upon three Layers – a Delivery Layer, supported by an Enabling Layer of<br />

corporate support services and directed by a very small Strategic Layer. A new performance<br />

management regime has been created to drive performance across the organisation. For<br />

the first time the performance of the Enabling Services will be measured against standards<br />

set out in internal business agreements. <strong>The</strong>se changes provide the basis for Phase 2 of<br />

the Restructuring programme, aimed at delivering significant effectiveness and efficiency<br />

benefits over the next two years.”<br />

Further MOD manpower reductions required: 2006<br />

13.40 In June 2006, Enabling Acquisition Change16 contained a DLO plan to reduce MOD manpower numbers from<br />

27,000 in October 2004 to 21,600 by March 2008. <strong>The</strong> Report observed:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Department has a record of being sound on analysis but less strong on implementation.<br />

<strong>The</strong> changes we have recommended should be incorporated into a single coherent DIS<br />

acquisition reform programme led at Departmental Level and managed in accordance<br />

with Office of Government Commerce best practice including a risk mitigation strategy.<br />

This programme should form part of the Defence Change Programme, but the governance<br />

arrangements will need to engage both the Acquisition Policy Board and the Defence<br />

Management Board. At the same time a major effort will be needed, involving Ministers<br />

and all members of the Defence Management Board to present the changes in a way that<br />

will bring them to life, and encourage the changes in behaviour and culture needed.” 17<br />

Formation of DE&S in 2007<br />

13.41 As explained in Chapter 12, there was no further bedding down time because plans were developed in 2006<br />

which led to the eventual merger on 1 April 2007 of the DPA and DLO to form the Defence Equipment &<br />

Support (DE&S).<br />

Conclusion on Change<br />

13.42<br />

<strong>The</strong> scale, pace and variety of ‘change’ which the MOD in general, and the DLO in particular, underwent<br />

during the period 1998 to 2006 has been without precedent in recent times. Indeed, there existed a state<br />

of almost continual revolution, such that the MOD has almost became addicted to ‘change’ and a ‘change<br />

culture’. ‘Change’ has been seen as a good thing per se. In some quarters, this attitude is still prevalent<br />

today.<br />

13.43 It is reassuring to see an article by an RAF officer in Desider (the DE&S’ own magazine) in February 2008<br />

on the RAF diaspora in Main Building referring to the subject of the Air Force Board’s (AFB) approach to<br />

leadership and, specifically, what is required from squadron and station commanders: “ [<strong>The</strong> AFB] want people<br />

in command who are confident enough not to succumb to changing things for the sake of change”.<br />

16 MOD Report, Enabling Aquisition Change, June 2006.<br />

17 Ibid, page 43.<br />

367

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