The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Failure to ask intelligent questions
Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
11.290 Witness O [QinetiQ] played an essentially passive role during the meeting. In the circumstances, this is
understandable. But is it disappointing that he did not ask BAE Systems any of the intelligent questions which
arguably should have been asked, i.e.: Why was there no review of how each of the hazards had been classified,
mitigated and sentenced? How many hazards had BAE Systems actually left “Unclassified” and/or “Open”?
How could PDS Task 06-3409 be considered completed when hazards remained “Unclassified”? How could the
aircraft be considered ALARP when hazards remained “Open” and “Unclassified”?
QinetiQ’s representative ‘booed’
11.291 I also set out in detail in Chapter 10A Witness O [QinetiQ]’s description of what took place during the meeting. I
accept his compelling evidence that when, at the end of the Customer Acceptance Conference on 1 September
2004 he initially refused to support the completion of the task by BAE Systems on the grounds that he was
only standing in and had not seen any of the key deliverable documents, the other attendees “booed me
and muttered things along the lines ‘bloody safety engineers always have to caveat their statements’” (see
Chapter 10A).
Witness O [QinetiQ] succumbed to the pressure
11.292 In interview with the Review, Witness O [QinetiQ] was questioned about the “consensus” that was apparently
reached at the meeting, namely that the task had been successfully completed by BAE Systems and that “the
aims and objectives of the project had successfully been achieved” whereupon Frank Walsh formally agreed on
behalf of the Nimrod IPT that “PDS Task -06-3409 could be considered closed by the issue of the minutes of
this Conference”. 137 He was adamant that, despite being booed, he maintained his principled stance on behalf
of QinetiQ and refused to be a party to the sign-off of the task. I have, however, concluded on all the evidence
that, unfortunately, Witness O [QinetiQ] did, in fact, succumb to the pressure at the meeting; and in the end,
did not wish to be seen to be standing in the way of what was clearly the strong ‘mood of the meeting’, namely
that BAE Systems had completed the task. This is principally for two reasons.
11.293 First, it is clear that Witness O [QinetiQ] undoubtedly felt under considerable pressure to conform and go along
with the ‘consensus’. He was a new boy at the meeting. He explained how he felt like ‘a fish out of water’.
He was not familiar with the project and had not been privy to BAE Systems’ work, although his colleague
Martyn Mahy had. It was clear what the strong collective view around the table was. It was also clear what the
attitude was to someone in his position having the temerity not to go along with it. He had been instructed by
Martyn Mahy not to agree to anything at this ‘customer acceptance conference’ but merely to ask a number of
questions. In these circumstances, it was perhaps unsurprising that he probably felt that he was not in a position
to rock the boat.
11.294 Second, the contemporaneous documents tend to suggest that Witness O [QinetiQ] was compliant and, indeed,
complimentary about the work that had been done and did not make a stand. A ‘Situation Report’ prepared
by Martyn Mahy on 5 November 2004 for Witness M [QinetiQ] referred to Witness O [QinetiQ]’s attendance
at the Customer Acceptance Conference on 31 August and 1 September 2004 ‘in his place’ and continued:
“QQ were happy with the SC presentation and the examination of the CASSANDRA database and supported
the sign-off of the Baseline Safety Case”. 138 Martyn Mahy said that this document recorded what Witness O
[QinetiQ] had said to him and Witness N [QinetiQ], the technical leader for the QinetiQ heavy aircraft section,
after the meeting. Witness O [QinetiQ] admitted to the Review that he probably did say at the meeting that he
was ‘happy’ with the presentation and the Hazard Log, but denied saying that he had supported the sign-off
to anyone, including Martyn Mahy. In my view, his recollection is faulty on this point (the wish being the father
of the thought). In any event, it is probably immaterial whether Witness O [QinetiQ] said, either at the meeting
itself or subsequently to Martyn Mahy, in terms that he ‘supported’ the sign-off. Since the presentations, in
particular Richard Oldfield’s presentation, were to the effect that the task was ‘complete’, Witness O [QinetiQ]’s
137 Paragraph 9 of the Minutes of the Customer Acceptance Conference.
138 This situation report subsequently formed the basis of Martyn Mahy’s report the QinetiQ Task Review Meeting which was to take place on 19
November 2004 - see further below.
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