The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
CHAPTER 13 – CUTS, CHANGE, DILUTION AND DISTRACTION
(1998-2006)
Contents
“There was no doubt that the culture at the time had switched. In the days of Sir Colin
Terry 1 you had to be on top of airworthiness. By 2004, you had to be on top of your
budget, if you wanted to get ahead”. (Former Senior RAF Officer, 2008)
“Your friend the British Soldier can stand up to anything except the British War Office.”
(George Bernard Shaw, 1856-1950, The Devil’s Disciple (1901))
“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into
teams, we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new
situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of
progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.” (Gaius Petronius
Arbiter, 210 BC) 2
Chapter 13 addresses the key organisational causes which contributed to the loss of XV230. It answers the following
questions:
Summary
What were the concerns in 1998 about maintaining the future airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet? Were
they heeded?
What organisational changes followed the 1998 Strategic Review? What was their cumulative effect?
What were the financial pressures during this period? What effect did they have?
What happened to the airworthiness regime in the MOD during this period?
What effect did the organisational changes and financial pressures have on the Defence Logistics
Organisation during this period?
Did organisational failings contribute to the loss of XV230? If so, how?
1. The MOD suffered a sustained period of deep organisational trauma between 1998 and 2006 due to
the imposition of unending cuts and change, which led to a dilution of its safety and airworthiness
regime and culture and distraction from airworthiness as the top priority.
1998 Strategic Defence Review
2. This organisational trauma stemmed from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review which unleashed a
veritable ‘tsunami’ of cuts and change within the MOD which was to last for years.
3. Financial pressures (in the shape of ‘cuts’, ‘savings’, ‘efficiencies’, ‘strategic targets’, ‘reduction in
output costs’, ‘leaning’, etc.) drove a cascade of multifarious organisational changes (called variously
‘change’, ‘initiatives’, ‘change initiatives’, ‘transformation’, ‘re-energising’, etc.) which led to a
dilution of the airworthiness regime and culture within the MOD and distraction from safety and
airworthiness issues. There was a shift in culture and priorities in the MOD towards ‘business’ and
financial targets, at the expense of functional values such as safety and airworthiness. The Defence
Logistics Organisation, in particular, came under huge pressure. Its primary focus became delivering
1 Air Chief Marshal Sir Colin Terry, Chief Engineer RAF (1997-1999).
2 But sometimes attributed to Charlton Ogburn, Jr. (1911-1998).
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