The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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A small percentage, however, were identified as potential airworthiness risks; nonetheless, the Nimrod Project
Team, in consultation with the Platform Safety and Environmental Working Group determined that no single
issue, or combination of issues, had undermined the airworthiness of the platform. 23 Nonetheless, the overall
findings of QinetiQ in the initial stages of the teardown highlighted a marked and worrying drop in ‘husbandry’
levels of the Nimrod fleet in recent years, as summarised by OC Engineering Wing RAF Kinloss: 24
“It is evident that ac entering Depth maintenance – particularly those returning from the
Middle East – are of a lower standard of husbandry than would have been expected a decade
ago; sand and detritus mask general husbandry degradation, a problem compounded in
the Gulf where dust and grime is pervasive. A concession has been granted to defer ac
washes to every 105 days periodically given the dry environment the ac are operating
in (UK 35 days). The decline in ac husbandry witnesses in this audit reflects a cultural
shortfall, an accepted gradual decline in husbandry over several years and is not restricted
to a particular maintenance or operating area.”
15.20 I deal with the topic of the teardown in further detail in Chapter 23.
QinetiQ inspections of RAF Kinloss aircraft
15.21
As an extension to the teardown project, and to provide some independent assessment of the inspections being
undertaken at RAF Kinloss and RAF Waddington following the loss of XV230, the Nimrod IPT Team contracted
QinetiQ to conduct an examination of two aircraft at RAF Kinloss in June and July 2009. An extremely thorough
examination was carried out by QinetiQ, who determined that there were a number of, mainly husbandry, issues
which had escaped detection during the inspections undertaken by maintenance personnel in both Forward
and Depth. Once again, some potential airworthiness issues were raised, but these were determined not to
present an airworthiness risk on closer study. This latest examination has underlined the need for constant
vigilance and thorough training of all personnel in the standards expected of them and has highlighted the
benefits of the auditing processes implemented by the MOD. The reports will be used to improve further
standards of maintenance across the MOD. Some of the deficiencies detected appear to have arisen as a result
of misunderstandings among maintenance personnel as to what was required of them, both in general terms
and specifically within the requirements of RTIs issued by the Nimrod IPT; RTI 21225 , for example, has been
reissued twice since the QinetiQ inspections, to clarify the IPT’s intent. It is important that the MOD use the
opportunity provided by these reports to ensure that the training and supervision of maintenance personnel
is of the highest standard, but also that communication within and between its organisations is conducted as
efficiently and clearly as possible. 26
XV249 incident in January 2008
15.22
In January 2008, smoke residues were discovered on the Cross-Feed duct and surrounding area of Nimrod R1
XV249 following a flight. 27 These were found to have resulted from short-lived combustion in this area. The
XV249 discovery caused considerable consternation since a fundamental tenet of the safety measures put into
place following the loss of XV230 and the BOI recommendations was that the Cross-Feed pipe was no longer
capable of providing a source of ignition. Concurrent with the inquiry into the event, the IPT issued UTIs to check
all Nimrods for similar smoke residue28 and to ensure that the Cross-Feed duct temperature on all aircraft was
below that needed to auto-ignite an accelerant. 29 Checks on the condition of the Cross-Feed duct both before
23 DE&S/WYT/4/3/12/1/Nim, dated 15 September 2009.
24 20080920-Nimrod Airworthiness Audit, dated 20 September 2008.
25 Which provided instructions on the Nimrod enhanced systems integrity checks introduced following the loss of XV230.
26 A Maintenance Error Investigation was undertaken by the RAF to determine more fully the reasons for the QinetiQ findings; its results were not
available as the Review went to press.
27 F765-WAD/9155/3/FSWHQ/8/08, dated 7 May 2008.
28 UTI 049.
29 UTI 051 and UTI 052.