The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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manner, earnestly seeking to find out what went wrong, and why, in order to learn lessons and improve matters
for the future, BAE Systems engaged with the Review largely in a defensive manner, as if it was conducting
litigation, with its primary concern appearing to be that of protecting its own position. BAE Systems says it has
recorded more than 20,000 man hours ‘assisting’ the Nimrod Review and providing evidence regarding XV230.
It appears, however, to have spent a significant amount of that time building a wall of denial and, at times,
obfuscation, which the Review has had to dismantle, brick by brick.
11.155 It is surprising and unfortunate that BAE Systems does not appear to have carried out its own internal investigation
into the loss of XV230. Instead, it seems to have relied upon the same people who were responsible for the NSC
to inform its responses to the Review. This may be one of the reasons why BAE Systems’ general stance has been
defensive and characterised by an unwillingness to accept even the obvious, notwithstanding that the evidence
upon which the criticisms of the NSC are based was almost exclusively BAE Systems’ own documentary and
witness evidence. Further, it has only been possible to piece together the history the NSC as a result of personal
archives and notebooks of BAE Systems personnel that came to light very late in the day. 91 The picture which
has emerged is markedly different from that set out in BAE Systems’ written submissions to the Review. The
statement, for instance, that at the customer acceptance “BAES presented the Baseline Safety Case Reports for
both the Nimrod MR Mk2 and the R Mk1” and there followed “a review of the reports presented by BAES”, is
not borne out by BAE Systems’ own internal evidence. BAE Systems’ lengthy, legalistic and defensive submissions
and witness evidence were tested in detail and found to be at variance with reality and the contemporaneous
documents.
11.156 BAE Systems’ internal ‘Product Liability’ guidance to employees provides: “Do maintain effective, complete
and detailed records of documentation, particularly those relating to safety”. Despite this, however, the
documentation disclosed by BAE Systems in response to a series of requests by the Review, whilst voluminous,
was incomplete and patchy. The same guidance also warns employees that “All of our documentation, including
e-mail, is open to inspection in the event of a product liability claim” and discourages the use of “loose phrases
or speculative remarks in documentation”. 92 But for the fortunate retention by Witness K [BAE Systems] of his
personal files and notebooks, much of the NSC story would not have come to light.
11.157 Regrettably, the defensive stance adopted by BAE Systems has lengthened the Review by many months.
11.158 It is important that the UK’s main defence industry contractors, and in particular BAE Systems as the prime
industry ‘partner’, understand and embrace the true meaning of ‘co-operation’ with accident inquiries such as
the Nimrod Review, which are charged with establishing the facts and responsibility, in order to learn rapid and
lasting lessons for the future in the national interest.
(23) BAE Systems has failed to live up to its expressed UK ethics 2002 policy of
“accountability, integrity, honesty, openness and respect”.
11.159 In my judgment, BAE Systems has failed to live up to its expressed ethics policy. In 2002, BAE Systems formalised
its UK ethics policy, setting out five key principles of ethical business conduct: “accountability, integrity, honesty,
openness and respect”. In my view, all five principles were breached in the present case.
93 11.160 In 2008 BAE Systems engaged the Woolf Committee to report on its company ethics. The Woolf Report
emphasised the importance of tackling the ‘ethical and reputational risks’ that arise through the interaction with
the Government as major contractors and the need to “embed a culture of openness and transparency”. 94 In my
view, BAE Systems was not ‘open and transparent’ when presenting the result of its NSC work to the Nimrod
IPT and QinetiQ.
91 Most of BAE Systems’ most significant disclosure was not handed to the Review until two working days before the commencement of the first round
of interviews; and most of the notebooks were disclosed on a piecemeal basis throughout the course of those interviews, and subsequently.
92 The ‘focal point’ for ‘Product Integrity’ within the Air Sector is said to be the Head of Airworthiness.
93 “Ethical business conduct in BAE Systems plc – the way forward”, May 2008 (the Woolf Committee Report).
94 Ibid, paragraph 5.11.