The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

10B.42
Chapter 10B – Nimrod Safety Case: The Facts (Third Phase)
Frank Walsh’s e-mail does not appear to have contained any detail or supporting material or referenced any
input from the Nimrod IPT Specialist Desks or Heads of Branch or Michael Eagles. Nevertheless, it appears
that George Baber was prepared to approve his request, because subsequently, on 1 February 2005, Frank
Walsh wrote to BAE Systems authorising them to set the post control status of the hazards in CASSANDRA
in accordance with an attached annex (Annex A) which he had prepared (see further below). I discuss in
Chapter 11 the significance of this and other steps taken in relation to the sentencing of the remaining risks.
The above e-mail shows an informality of approach to the sentencing of risks by both George Baber as IPTL
and Frank Walsh as Safety Manager. George Baber’s explanation in interview was “I trusted him and I took
what he said at face value”. It remained, however, George Baber’s personal responsibility as IPTL, Project
Engineer and Letter of Delegation holder, to ensure that the risks were properly sentenced.
1 February 2005: Frank Walsh’s memo to BAE Systems
10B.43
Annex A
10B.44
10B.45
On 1 February 2005, Frank Walsh drafted a memo to BAE Systems which he signed and sent out under his
own name. It stated that the Nimrod IPT had reviewed the BLSC produced by BAE Systems, agreed with
the status of the hazards set by BAE Systems, and had considered the evidence to set the rest. Attached to
the memo was an annex (Annex A) entitled “Evidence for Mitigation of Hazards” (Annex A) which he had
prepared, and which was described as “the evidence that should be entered into the hazard log as controls
and the post control status as decided by the IPT”. Frank Walsh said that his Annex A was based on a template
which he had been sent by Witness C [BAE Systems]. It was not clear when, but probably shortly before.
Frank Walsh’s Annex A purported to show the mitigating Controls and Post Control Status of 33 hazards. 32
of these hazards were those which BAE Systems had left “Open” and “Unclassified” in Annex B to the BLSC. 6
A total of 21 of these were referred to as “Interacting Systems” hazards and contained identical entries.
It is clear, therefore, that by 1 February 2005, Frank Walsh had had a look at Annexes B and C of the BLSC
Reports and discovered that there were, in fact, a large number of “Open” and “Unclassified” hazards which
remained to be sentenced. This contrasted starkly with the picture which he had presented to the Sixth PSWG
when he had highlighted only a handful of hazards as requiring action.
Frank Walsh’s realisation
10B.46
It is not clear precisely when, and how, Frank Walsh, came by this realisation or revelation. He was unable or
unwilling to give a clear or satisfactory explanation to the Review in interview. It is likely that, sometime after
the Sixth PSWG meeting had tasked him to produce a document to ‘sign-off’ the NSC, he turned to the BLSC
Reports and discovered that there were in fact a large number of hazards which had been left “Open” and
“Unclassified”. Upon making this discovery, it appears that he did not (as one might expect) immediately draw
it to the attention of Michael Eagles or George Baber. The question arises, why not? The likelihood is that it
was a combination of the fact that he was simply too embarrassed at this point in time because he should
have spotted it earlier, and a sense that it did not really matter because the task had been formally signed-off
and the Nimrod was safe anyway, and a belief that he could quietly find mitigating evidence to sentence all
the remaining hazards without difficulty. This is, in any event, what he proceeded to do. Unfortunately, Frank
Walsh’s attempt to sentence these hazards (including Hazard H73) was woefully inadequate. There exists no
documentary trail, however, of precisely how he went about it.
Annex A: Control and Post Control Status for 19 “Interacting Systems” hazards
10B.47
Annex A contained identical entries in the Control and Post Control Status for 25 of the 30 Unclassified
“Interacting Systems” hazards (Hazards H44 to H82). The entry for Hazard H73 relating to the No. 7 Tank Dry
Bay is illustrative and reads as follows:
6 There was an extra hazard (Hazard H106) added to Annex A “Failure of Post Baseline Modifications” .
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