The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Criticism of individuals
Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
14. The following key BAE Systems management personnel involved in the Nimrod Safety Case in
2001-2005 bear primary responsibility for the above matters:
Chris Lowe (Chief Airworthiness Engineer).
Richard Oldfield (Task Leader).
Eric Prince (Flight Systems and Avionics Manager).
Lack of true co-operation with the Review
15. BAE Systems says it has recorded more than 20,000 man hours ‘assisting’ the Nimrod Review and
providing evidence. It appears to the Review, however, to have spent a significant amount of that
time building a wall of denial and obfuscation which the Review has had to dismantle, brick by
brick. This has inevitably lengthened the Nimrod Review considerably.
Culture
16. The regrettable conduct of some of BAE Systems’ managers suggests that BAE Systems has failed
to implement an adequate or effective culture, committed to safety and ethical conduct. The
responsibility for this must lie with the leadership of the Company.
17. BAE Systems formalised its UK ethics policy in 2002, setting out five key principles of ethical
business conduct: “accountability, integrity, honesty, openness and respect”. In my judgment, all
five principles were breached in the present case.
Nimrod IPT
18. The IPT at the time bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case.
General failures in situ
19. The IPT inappropriately delegated project management of the Nimrod Safety Case task to a relatively
junior person without adequate oversight or supervision; failed to ensure adequate operator
involvement in BAE Systems’ work on Phases 1 and 2 of the Nimrod Safety Case; failed properly to
project manage the Nimrod Safety Case, or to act as an ‘intelligent customer’ at any stage; failed
to read the Nimrod Safety Case Reports carefully or otherwise check BAE Systems’ work; failed to
follow its own Safety Management Plan; failed properly to appoint an Independent Safety Advisor
to audit the Nimrod Safety Case; and subsequently signed-off BAE Systems’ work in circumstances
where it was manifestly inappropriate to do so.
Sentence of risks on manifestly inadequate basis
20. The IPT sentenced risks on a manifestly inadequate, flawed and unrealistic basis, and in doing so miscategorised
the catastrophic fire risk represented by the Cross-Feed/Supplementary Conditioning
Pack duct (Hazard H73) as ‘Tolerable’ when it plainly was not.
Fundamental failure to ensure safety
21. The IPT failed to ensure that resources within the IPT were properly utilised to ensure the airworthiness
of the Nimrod fleet and to ensure that safety and airworthiness was the first priority.
22. The IPT was sloppy and complacent and outsourced its thinking.
23. The IPT fundamentally failed to do its essential job of ensuring the safety of the Nimrod aircraft.
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