The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
10B.36 I deal in Chapter 11 with the appropriateness of QinetiQ’s conduct in supporting the sign-off of the BLSC.
I conclude that it was manifestly inappropriate, not least because QinetiQ had neither read the Reports, nor
checked them, nor seen any ISA review. Furthermore, the BLSC contained large holes: 40% of the hazards
remained “Open” and 30% “Unclassified” with a series of open-ended recommendations.
Sentencing of remaining hazards by the Nimrod IPT
10B.37 I now turn to how the remaining “Open” and “Unclassified” hazards came to be sentenced by the Nimrod IPT
such that, by March 2005, the NSC was considered completed and proof that both Nimrod types were ALARP.
Irony
10B.38
248
There is an irony about these events. BAE Systems had failed to complete the BLSC by a substantial margin,
having left a large proportion of hazards “Open” and “Unclassified” (including Hazard H73 which it had
failed to analyse properly in the first place). BAE Systems sought, effectively, to pass a substantial proportion
of the NSC task back to the Nimrod IPT undone. This meant that, in theory at least, the Nimrod IPT had
a fresh opportunity to capture the risks which BAE Systems had not previously spotted, including the risk
inherent in Hazard H73. Unfortunately, the Nimrod IPT failed to grasp this opportunity. This was for a variety
of reasons, but not least that the Nimrod IPT’s guard was down because of what they had understood from
the Customer Acceptance Conference. This was, however, no excuse for their failure to analyse and sentence
these remaining risks properly.
15 December 2004: Formal ‘sign-off’ letter of the BLSC by George Baber
10B.39
10B.40
Frank Walsh had been tasked by the Sixth PSWG meeting to produce a document for the IPTL to ‘sign off’
the NSC. On 15 December 2004, he presented a memo to George Baber for signature with wide distribution
(including to DG Log(Strike), D Log 2/3 Gp and AD Eng Pol) announcing the IPTL’s intention to sign-off the
Nimrod BLSC. The memo said that the production of the NSC for the MR2 and the R1 had been completed by
BAE Systems, and that their reports concluded that the platforms were “ACCEPTABLY SAFE TO OPERATE AND
MAINTAIN UP TO RETIREMENT FROM SERVICE…” but the Reports were too large to distribute and would be
kept on file. The memo concluded:
“Therefore, following acceptance of the Reports at the 6th Nimrod Platform Safety
Working Group held on 10 Nov 04, I am pleased to advise of my intention to sign-off the
Nimrod Baseline SC. I would like to thank and congratulate both BAE Systems and EWAD
on the depth of detail and standard of production that they have employed in meeting the
requirements of a Baseline SC.”
On 22 December 2004, Frank Walsh faxed a copy of this memo to Witness C [BAE Systems] referring to it as
the ‘baseline’ letter.
20 January 2005: E-mail from Frank Walsh to George Baber
10B.41
On 20 January 2005, Frank Walsh e-mailed George Baber as follows:
“George,
All the hazards in CASSANDRA, with the exception of H2 .... have controls
and references in place to show that they are at ALARP. I am awaiting a copy
of the Unit snow and ice plan to include as mitigation for H2.
I believe that the hazards, except H2, should be set to MANAGED on
CASSANDRA now and H2 when the last piece of mitigation is in place.
If you agree I will instruct BAE Systems to amend CASSANDRA.
Frank”