The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
26
BOI Report
Board of Inquiry convened
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
Immediately following the news that XV230 was down, a Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened by the Air Officer
Commanding (AOC) No. 2 Group in accordance with the requirements of Joint Service Publication 551. The
BOI comprised Wing Commander Nick Sharpe (President), Squadron Leader John Nelson, and Squadron Leader
Andrew Gransden. The BOI members assembled on 3 September 2006 at the Headquarters of No. 2 Group at
RAF High Wycombe and were flown to Kandahar together with a Defence Aviation Safety Centre BOI Advisor,
RAF Accident Recovery personnel and Royal Navy Flight Safety/Accident Investigation team personnel. The BOI
was prevented, however, from visiting the crash site because of the high level of enemy threat. It set about
gathering evidence and conducting interviews. On return to RAF Kinloss, on 18 September 2006, it began the
task of analysing such evidence as had fortunately been gathered by allied troops first on the scene (of which
the Data Acquisition and Recording Unit (DARU) and the Mission Tape proved invaluable), photographs taken at
the crash site, and some recovered items of equipment, together with the Air Traffic Control (ATC) recordings,
the witness evidence, and records of previous Boards of Inquiry and other investigations relating to accidents
involving Nimrods.
After nearly seven months of painstaking work, the BOI delivered its Report to the Convening Authority on 20
April 2007 and a further supplementary report on 25 July 2007. The President and members of the BOI received
praise from all quarters for the thoroughness of their Report which demonstrated “tenacity and determination”
in seeking to ascertain the true causes of the accident. 2 I entirely agree with, and endorse, this consensus.
Within a relatively short period of time, and despite the formidable forensic difficulties faced due to the lack
of physical evidence, the BOI produced a thorough and logical report which clearly identified the most likely
causes of the fire and explosion, highlighted a number of significant failings, and made a series of valuable and
practical recommendations.
It was not within the BOI’s remit to consider, or attribute, responsibility for the accident.
The BOI found that XV230 was lost because of an uncontrollable fire in the fuselage which led to a break up of
the aircraft in mid-air. The entire BOI Report should be treated as incorporated into this Report. A copy of the
redacted version is publicly available and can be found at: http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/aboutdefence/
corporatepublications/boardsofinquiry/boinimrodmr2xv230.htm.
BOI’s Conclusions as to the Location of the Fire
3.5
3.6
The BOI’s first task was to identify the location of the fire, particularly given the apparently contradictory
evidence of the Harrier GR7 pilot and that provided by ‘A’ Squadron Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD). 3 The BOI’s
conclusion was that the fire had originated on the starboard side of the aircraft. 4 Whilst it was impossible to
discount completely the existence of a fire on the port side of XV230, if there was one, it was subsidiary to the
main fire and caused by it. 5 Having reconstructed the possible view of the aircraft held by the RCD as it passed
their position, and with the benefit of independent analysis by the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB), the
BOI determined that both the aspect of the aircraft and its relative size could have led the RCD to conclude that
the aircraft was banking to the left and that the large, luminous starboard fire was on the port side. 6
From the evidence available, the BOI considered that the fire may have initiated in one of four locations, namely:
(1) the bomb bay; (2) the No. 3 engine; (3) the starboard Rib 1 landing; and (4) the dry bay forward of the
starboard No. 7 fuel tank, which has since come to be known as the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. 7 The BOI
2 See Comments on BOI Report by the RAF Kinloss Station Commander, paragraph 1 [3-1]; and Comments by Air Member for Materiel, Air Marshal
Sir Barry Thornton, Air Officer Commanding No. 2 Group, Air-Vice Marshal Andy Pulford, and Commander-in-Chief Air Command, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Clive Loader.
3 BOI Report, paragraph 22 [2-13].
4 BOI Report, paragraph 22a [2-13].
5 BOI Report, paragraph 22c [2-14].
6 BOI Report, paragraph 22b [2-13].
7 BOI Report, paragraph 23 [2-14].