The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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524
The BOI process for investigating military aircraft accidents has not always proven effective in identifying
the technical and human factor issues associated with military aircraft. The SI presidents are neither trained
nor experienced in undertaking an investigation. The results of SIs are very much dependent on the calibre
of who is appointed, which in turn may depend on who is available at the time. Whilst the commitment of
members of BOI/SIs to carry out the task thoroughly is not in doubt, and many BOI Reports are of remarkably
impressive quality, 45 the current system has more than an element of happenstance and amateurism about it.
However, the AAIB is unlikely to be familiar with the weapons and systems on military aircraft and does not
undertake investigations into accidents that occur on deployed operations. The RN, however, who make up
this shortfall, lack experience of large aircraft or fast jets.
Tench Report (1986)
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In 1986, the then Defence Minister, Lord Trefgarne, commissioned the UK’s Chief Air Accident Inspector, Mr
William Tench, to “review the procedures pertaining to Service Boards of Inquiry”. The Tench Report was highly
critical of the MOD BOI system of accident investigation on two main basis: (1) low standards; and (2) lack of
independence. As regards (1), the Tench Report pointed to “mediocre standards” where investigations were
conducted by “complete novices”. As regards (2), the Tench Report said: “pervasive nature of the involvement
of some Station Commanders, Air Officer Commanding’s Staff Officers and even the Commander-in-Chief, is
an unwelcome intrusion upon what should be the complete independence of the Board of Inquiry”. The Tench
Report concluded that BOIs had “outlived their usefulness”. The thrust of Mr. William Tench’s Report was the
need for high quality, independent investigations of military accidents which were immune from interference.
Lord Trefgarne recently expressed dismay that the 1986 Tench Report had not been implemented. I share his
disquiet on the failure to implement the major tenets of the Tench Report (though I do not agree with all of
it). It is fair to observe, however, that there have been significant improvements in the military inquiry regime
in the past 20 years, in particular: (a) BOIs have been able to involve the Air Accident Investigation Branch
(AAIB); (b) BOIs can no longer investigate fault; and (c) differences in procedure between the three Services
have been ironed out under the new SI process. But, in my view, further fundamental reform of this area is
long overdue to put military inquiries on a sound footing as outlined below.
Three important points for the future
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21.113
In my view, there are three points of importance for the future. First, it is vital that military accident
investigations are carried out in a thorough and professional manner by personnel who have the requisite
training, experience and support. The ability of BOIs to use the good offices of the AAIB to assist in more
recent investigations has been a welcome advance. But it is no longer sufficient for ‘gifted amateurs’ to be
expected to be taken off the Front Line and thrust into conducting an investigation without any previous
training or experience. (The RAF were fortunate in the current case that the President and members of the
Nimrod XV230 Board of Inquiry happened to be of particularly outstanding ability, integrity and experience
and showed remarkable forensic perseverance throughout their painstaking inquiry: the President, Group
Captain Nick Sharpe had over 20 years experience on Nimrods; Squadron Leader John Nelson had almost
30 years, and is recognised as one of the most experienced and capable air engineers in the fleet, whilst
Squadron Leader Andrew Gransden’s experience as an engineer stretched back over 34 years.)
Second, it is vital that military accident investigations are independent, and seen to be independent and
impartial. The military at all ranks, and the public, need to have confidence both in the process and the
outcome. Increasingly in recent times, BOIs have understandably been the subject of public, media and legal
scrutiny as to their effectiveness and independence. There has always been a constitutional problem in terms
of demonstrable independence arising from the simple fact that AOAs are their own convening authority.
SIs are convened by the respective AOAs from each Service. Further, those appointed to BOI Inquiry teams
may have flown the aircraft in question and may even have known the individuals involved in the accident.
Whilst there are real advantages in investigators having this sort of close knowledge, equally, it may give rise
to questions as to real or perceived objectivity and partisanship, namely criticism that AOAs are investigating
45 e.g the BOI Report into the loss of XV230.