The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Detailed analysis and criticisms of Nimrod IPT
Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
(1) The Nimrod IPT’s attitude to the NSC was flawed from the outset: the Nimrod IPT
assumed that the Nimrod was ‘safe anyway’ because of its long record.
11.181 In my judgment, the Nimrod IPT’s attitude to the NSC was fundamentally affected by the prevailing malaise
(outlined earlier) that, because the Nimrod had operated safety for over 30 years, it could be assumed that
the Nimrod was ‘safe anyway’ and that, therefore, the NSC exercise did not really matter. Thus it was that the
Nimrod IPT’s approach to the NSC was flawed and undermined throughout: the safety of the Nimrod fleet was
assumed and NSC task viewed as essentially a ‘box’ under BP1201 which had to be ‘ticked’.
11.182 It was suggested by George Baber in interview that the Nimrod IPT should be given credit for going further
than was strictly required by BP1201 by producing an ‘explicit’ Safety Case rather than relying on the Release to
Service (RTS) as an ‘implicit’ Safety Case under BP1201. In my view, there is nothing in this point. It would have
been remiss not to have produced an ‘explicit’ Safety Case for a legacy aircraft such as the Nimrod. And having
determined to do so, there was no excuse for not doing a proper job.
(2) The Nimrod IPT inappropriately delegated the management of the NSC task to a
relatively junior person without inadequate oversight or supervision.
11.183 In my judgment, the Nimrod IPT inappropriately delegated the management of the NSC task to a junior person
who was given inadequate supervision or oversight. There was a failure of management by the key personnel
within the Nimrod IPT and a failure to perform and adhere to their respective roles and responsibilities.
Respective Roles and Responsibilities
11.184 The roles and responsibilities of the three key personnel in the Nimrod IPT were as follows:
11.182.1 The Nimrod IPTL and PE, George Baber, had specific and general overall responsibilities for safety
under the Nimrod SMP. 104 He had overall responsibility for management of the personnel in the
Nimrod IPT and for ensuring that Nimrod IPT personnel properly performed, and adhered to, their
respective roles and responsibilities. He was a Letter of Delegation (LOD) holder 105 and had authority
to decide whether Class ‘A’ and ‘B’risks had been managed to ALARP.
11.182.2 The Head of Air Vehicle, Michael Eagles, had primary responsibility for managing the development
of the NSC. Under the Nimrod SMP, the Head of Air Vehicle had “Ownership of the Nimrod SC
and HL” and responsibility for advising the IPTL “on safety matters”. 106 He was an LOD holder, with
responsibility for identifying and approving equipment hazards on the Hazard Log, and had authority
to decide whether Class ‘C’ and ‘D’ risks had been managed to ALARP. 107
11.182.3 The Safety Manager, Frank Walsh, had more general safety responsibilities under the Nimrod SMP. 108
He was not an LOD holder and had no authority to sentence risks himself. It was felt that this gave
him independence.
Failure to perform
11.185 Michael Eagles failed to perform his role as Head of Air Vehicle in relation to the NSC. He failed to manage
the production of the NSC personally. He effectively delegated management of the project wholesale to the
Safety Manager, Frank Walsh. He failed to ensure the Heads of Branch provided engineering support in respect
of the NSC. He failed to play any real role in ensuring the NSC project was fully and satisfactorily completed.
104 Paragraph 10, page A-4 of the Nimrod SMP.
105 Letter of Delegation from Director General Equipment Support (Air) to George Baber, dated 14 and 22 May 2002.
106 Paragraph 9, page A-4 of the Nimrod SMP.
107 Letter of Delegation from George Baber to Michael Eagles, dated 23 October 2003.
108 Paragraph 10, page A-4 of the Nimrod SMP.
307