The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Introduction
24.1
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There are a number of current weaknesses in the area of personnel in the MOD which have an impact on the
effectiveness of the MOD Airworthiness regime, I discuss these weaknesses below:
(1) Undervaluing and dilution of engineers and engineering skills.
24.2
In recent years, engineers and engineering have tended to be undervalued and diluted notwithstanding their critical
role in the overall regime for assuring and ensuring Airworthiness, particularly in the context of ‘legacy’ aircraft.
MBAs and general management skills are no substitute for knowledge and qualifications of a highly technical
subject. Equally, it makes no sense to put a sub-mariner in charge of air platforms, just as it would make no sense
to put a fast jet pilot in charge of nuclear submarines. Manifestations of this general trend have included:
24.2.1 The denouement of the Chief Engineer RAF;
24.2.2 The removal of OC Engineering at RAF Kinloss following the imposition of the Trenchard model;
24.2.3 A ‘glass ceiling’ regarding job opportunities;
24.2.4 The loss of increasing numbers of skilled and experienced Non-Commissioned engineering Officers to
Industry;
24.2.5 The dilution of engineering training by ‘multi-skilling’;
24.2.6 The notion of ‘self-supervision’ and removal of layers of Forward and Depth maintenance engineering
supervision; and
24.2.7 Increasing outsourcing of engineering roles and tasks to Industry.
(2) Engineers are not required to have professional status.
24.3
Engineering officers within the Services who make Airworthiness decisions are not required to hold professional
status. They are authorised to make Airworthiness decisions by virtue of being holders of Letters of Delegation
(LOD). Theirs is a heavy responsibility. They are expected to make vital Airworthiness decisions, often on a
daily basis and at short notice. They are not, however, required to hold any professional qualification, e.g.
membership of the Association of Chartered Engineers.
(3) Decline in the ability of the MOD to act as an “intelligent customer”.
24.4
The decline in skilled and knowledgeable manpower, and the reduction of the ‘light blue, dark blue, and
khaki’ has reduced the MOD’s ability to act as an ‘intelligent customer’ in its dealings with Industry. Further, the
increasing scale of outsourcing to Industry in relation to an ever-widening range of tasks, has to some extent
had a corrosive effect and undermined internal confidence within the Services that they can either do things for
themselves, or judge properly tasks which they have outsourced.
(4) Turf wars and inter-Service rivalries for jobs and roles.
24.5
There is much inter-Service rivalry; some healthy, some unhealthy. Tribalism manifests itself keenly in competition
for the top and middle-ranking jobs and the creation of new roles. Each of the Services, including the Civil
Service, has a natural desire: (a) to enhance its own power, prestige and influence, often in the endearing belief
that it knows better than its rivals; (b) to protect its own turf; and (c) to look after, and promote, its own people.
Instead of appointing the best person for the job there is sometimes a strong element of either ‘Buggins’ turn, or
Machiavelli, or a political compromise. Jobs or roles are sometimes allocated to the Service that out-manoeuvres
the others, or to the Service next in line for that post, or on the basis of a horse-trading. In the arena of Safety
and Airworthiness this is not a satisfactory state of affairs. All decisions which have a bearing on Safety and
Airworthiness must be made objectively, without fear or favour. The question should always be ‘Who is the best
person for the job?’.