The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
(2) Increased operational tempo: Afghanistan and Iraq
13.95
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Second, at the same time, Sir Malcolm Pledger had inherited one major operation, namely the conflict in
Afghanistan (Operation ‘HERRICK’) which had been running for nearly a year since coalition operations
were launched on 7 October 2001. To add to this, within six months of his appointment, UK forces were
committed to a second major conflict, the invasion of Iraq (Operation ‘TELIC’) which took place on 20 March
2003, and the subsequent aftermath.
(3) Did not believe he was fully qualified for the job
13.96
He told the Review, candidly, that he did not believe that he was fully qualified for the job of CDL. He said
this was one of the reasons why he attended a two-week course at the IMD Business School in Switzerland.
He was not a logistician or an engineer; he was a career helicopter pilot who had only brief hands-on logistics
experience and no business experience.
(4) No clear plan
13.97 He told the Review that he was not aware of there being any “clear plan” drawn up of how the Strategic
Goal and other targets were going to be achieved. He insisted that said there should have been such a plan
“from day one”:
“MR HADDON-CAVE QC: You said earlier, Sir Malcolm, that you didn’t think [a clear]
plan existed as to how to deliver all this. Should there have been a plan —
SIR MALCOLM PLEDGER: To my mind —
MR HADDON-CAVE QC: — from day one?
SIR MALCOLM PLEDGER: Absolutely. I think there was what I would call a top level piece
from Sam, that described the strategic arrangements and the expectations. But I don’t —
I never saw a translation of those high level ideals into what I will call the “project activities”
that would have then been visible and could have accumulated an answer to that top level
strategic aim.”
(5) No idea whether targets deliverable
13.98 It is perhaps unsurprising, in these circumstances, that he admitted to the Review that he had “no idea”
whether the targets were deliverable.
Tension between delivering ‘20% efficiencies’ and supporting the conflicts
13.99
When questioned by the Review as to whether he felt there was an inherent tension between being required
to deliver the 20% Strategic Goal and the need to support the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, Sir Malcolm
Pledger initially said ‘no’. His initial explanation (‘delivering more with less’) contained an element of ex post
facto rationalisation. When questioned further, however, he gave a more candid and compelling explanation:
he said he was a ‘realist’ and explained that, because the 20% Goal was already in place and was part of the
Government’s published agenda, he felt he could not ignore it and as CDL he was ‘accountable’:
“MR PARSONS QC: ... What I am trying to explore from your perspective is whether you
considered it was appropriate for you to still be under the pressure of all this tasking to
achieve a 20 per cent or bust, when the priority is to improve efficiency to support the
front line.
SIR MALCOLM PLEDGER: I just think I’m a realist, I am afraid. It existed. And yes, it was
another pressure. But I tried to turn a requirement into a virtue.
MR PARSONS QC: But they are different pressures, aren’t they?