The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
work (and failing to ask for copies of the Reports when they were not initially supplied); (6) failing to advise the
Nimrod IPT properly at the Sixth Platform Safety Working Group meeting or ask any intelligent questions; (7)
subsequently ‘signing off’ or supporting the ‘sign-off’ of BAE Systems’ NSC reports in circumstances where it
was manifestly inappropriate to do so: (a) without even having read any of them; and (b) in the absence of an
ISA audit report, contrary to JSP553 and Def-Stan 00-56.
11.327 It is right to point out that Martyn Mahy may have felt somewhat bruised by his earlier encounters with the
Nimrod IPTL when QinetiQ had been accused of ‘touting for business’ and relations were not good. It is also
right to point out that he might have expected to have had more management help and guidance from, e.g. his
Technical Manger and Technical Assurance Manager. It is not clear that he particularly asked for any or was given
it save in relation to the early breakdown of relations with the IPT. It was unfortunate that, for understandable
reasons, he was unable to attend the crucial Customer Acceptance Conference and Witness O [QinetiQ] had to
go in his stead. It is also right to point out, as he did in interview, that “There were people at that [19 November
2004] meeting in a senior position to me, such as Colin Blagrove, Technical Assurance Manager, who could have
raised that concern himself”.
11.328 Nevertheless, I am satisfied that Martyn Mahy failed to do his job as Task Manager properly in certain key
respects, and failed to give any sort of real independent assurance, even in the limited role which he and
QinetiQ had been assigned and adopted. For the reasons given above, his most blameworthy fault was agreeing
on behalf of QinetiQ to ‘sign-off’ or support the sign off of the NSC and BLSC without seeing or reading the
Reports.
Technical Leader
11.329 In my view, the Technical Leader for the Nimrod 010 Safety Management task also bears some share of the
responsibility for QinetiQ’s failures outlined above. He was Martyn Mahy’s line manager and responsible for
ensuring the technical input was correct. He possibly could, and should, have done more at the time to ensure
he had proper oversight of Martyn Mahy’s handling of the Nimrod 010 Safety Management task and thought
more carefully about the direction in which QinetiQ’s involvement was drifting. His involvement was, however,
sporadic and intermittent and he was unsighted as to some of the details. QinetiQ’s ‘Matrix Management
System’ may not have particularly assisted in this regard. In all the circumstances, I have concluded that it would
not be appropriate, fair or proportionate to name him in this report.
Colin Blagrove
11.330 Colin Blagrove was the Technical Assurance Manager for the Nimrod 010 Safety Management task and DAOS
signatory. It was his ultimate responsibility to ensure that QinetiQ did not sign off anything unless it was
appropriate to do so. He failed in this critical task.
11.331 The fact that QinetiQ found itself in the position whereby it ‘signed-off’ on the NSC and BLSC Reports in
circumstances where it was manifestly inappropriate from an assurance point of view to do so, is due to a failure
of management and leadership. Ultimately, it was for him, as the senior person responsible for assurance, to
stop the drift and ensure that: (a) QinetiQ’s role was clarified; and (b) QinetiQ insisted on being given proper
sight of relevant documents, proper tasking and proper opportunity to carry out its role. It was for him, as the
senior person responsible for assurance present at the critical Task Review Meeting on 19 November 2004. to
make it clear that QinetiQ could not put its name to something which it had not read and which, in any event,
required a full ISA report for which QinetiQ would have to be properly tasked. The fact that he did not do so, but
instead showcased QinetiQ’s new Safety Case process which should be more to the IPTs liking, was symptomatic
of QinetiQ’s unfortunately lax and compliant approach to the Nimrod IPT at the time. He candidly admitted “...
I think we let it drift over us at that meeting”.
11.332 It is fair to bear in mind the following points. First, this was only one of large number of tasks and areas in
which Colin Blagrove was involved or responsible for at the time. Second, his involvement in the project was
intermittent and only as required. Third, he did not get as much assistance from the Technical Leader as he might
have expected.
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