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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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10B.15<br />

10B.16<br />

Chapter 10B – <strong>Nimrod</strong> Safety Case: <strong>The</strong> Facts (Third Phase)<br />

– 6 Hazards have been assessed as HRI ‘B’. It is recommended that IPT accept these hazards<br />

as closed at a probability of REMOTE, by being adequately managed ALARP without further<br />

recommendation being proffered.<br />

– 32 Hazards of which the majority are of the Zonal Hazard type, remain OPEN as probability<br />

of UNCLASSIFIED due to DA being unable to identify sufficient evidence for a robust and<br />

meaningful probability. Towards closure, it is recommended that IPT consider the ANNEX<br />

C Section C2 table 1 recommendations against these respective Open Hazards.” (emphasis<br />

added)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Conclusion also had the following subtly different formulation of the statement which appeared in the<br />

Executive Summary: 3<br />

“From the above, it is thus declared that all potential hazards have been identified, assessed<br />

and addressed to ALARP (subject to consideration of the proferred recommendations) and<br />

that all appropriate standards had been met. Accepting this the top level goal of the<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> MR Mk2 type Equipment Safety Case that<br />

“<strong>The</strong> aircraft type is deemed acceptably safe to operate and maintain within<br />

specified contexts”<br />

is considered as having been demonstrated as having been achieved.” (emphasis added)<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was also no mitigation evidence of any sort included in either of the BLSC Reports. <strong>The</strong>re was, therefore,<br />

no basis upon which the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT or QinetiQ could check and satisfy themselves that BAE Systems had<br />

used appropriate mitigation evidence to sentence the hazards.<br />

Annexes to BLSC<br />

10B.17<br />

<strong>The</strong> BLSC Phase 2 Report for the MR2 ran to 46 pages, and had attached several lengthy Annexes including:<br />

Annex A, “Fault Tree Analysis Accident Model” (42 pages); Annex B, “Summary of Hazard Risk Indices against<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> MR Mk2 Identified Hazards” (9 pages) and Annex C, “Summary of <strong>Nimrod</strong> MR Mk2 Recommendations<br />

made within this Safety Case Baseline Project” (26 pages).<br />

10B.18 Annex B stated in relation to Hazard H73 (one of the 32 open hazards left “Unclassified”):<br />

HAZARD I/D<br />

ZONE<br />

DESCRIPTION<br />

H73 Zone 513/613<br />

Interacting<br />

System<br />

Hazards – No.<br />

7 Fuel Tank<br />

3 Page 46 of the BLSC Report on the MR2.<br />

SEVERITY PROBABILITY HRI<br />

RECOMMENDED<br />

HAZARD STATUS<br />

CATASTROPHIC UNCLASSIFIED – OPEN<br />

243

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