The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
11.262 Third, there was a general dilution of oversight and guidance from above (see further Chapter 13). He said in
interview that the eventual removal of the 2-Star oversight in relation his LOD made him feel “abandoned”.
11.263 Despite all this, in my judgment, George Baber’s performance nevertheless fell well below the standard that
might reasonably have been expected of someone in his position at the time. As Nimrod IPTL, Nimrod PE and
an LOD holder during the period 2002-2006, George Baber failed to give adequate priority, care and personal
attention to the preparation of the NSC. He failed properly to utilise the resources available to him within the
Nimrod IPT to ensure the airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet. He failed to give the NSC the priority it deserved. In
doing so, he failed, in truth, to make safety his first priority.
Wing Commander Michael Eagles
11.264 Michael Eagles, as Head of Air Vehicle, bears a significant share of the blame for the failures of the Nimrod IPT
in relation to the NSC. His was a complete failure to do his job in relation to the NSC. As Nimrod Head of Air
Vehicle, Michael Eagles had a pivotal safety role in the Nimrod IPT. His responsibilities included ‘ownership’ of
the production of the NSC. His was, however, an abrogation of responsibility. He failed to perform his role to
manage the production of the NSC and failed to exercise proper supervision and management of the Safety
Manager, Frank Walsh. He delegated the project wholesale to Frank Walsh, whilst he concentrated on other
things. Frank Walsh was, however, too inexperienced and insufficiently competent to manage such a project,
at least without very detailed supervision. Michael Eagles exercised little oversight or supervision in relation to
Frank Walsh. Michael Eagles also failed to follow processes clearly laid down in the Nimrod SMP.
11.265 Michael Eagles’ culpability must be judged in context. First, he was newly promoted to the rank of Wing
Commander. This was a significant step up. He may have found the job demanding and even been out of his
depth in some respects. Prior to joining the Nimrod IPT in August 2003, he had never worked on Nimrods. He
had never even worked in an IPT. He had no experience of safety cases, hazard management or risk assessment.
He received no specific training in these topics. Second, he had a very heavy workload which included: (1) line
management responsibilities for individuals at Chadderton, RAF Kinloss and RAF Wyton; (2) BLSC and SMP for
the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight; (3) preparation of a Life Extension paper on the Nimrod; (4) negotiating
NISC 3 which was intended to produce savings on support contracts; (5) costs comparisons between the MR2
and MR4; (6) managing the switch to an ‘equalised’ maintenance policy, which was intended to produce
savings of £8,000,000; (7) responsibility for aspects of maintenance at RAF Kinloss following the acquisition
of responsibility for Depth by the Nimrod IPT; (8) dealing with maintenance backlogs due to the extension of
the MR2 out of service date; and (9) dealing with changes to the operational use of the Nimrod following the
addition of equipment for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, his workload was exacerbated by manpower
and resources issues within the IPT, in particular posts being left ‘gapped’. Third, there is little evidence of any
oversight being exercised in relation to him, in turn, by George Baber who, on the contrary, appeared to assent
to the arrangement.
11.266 Despite this, in my judgment, Michael Eagles’ performance nevertheless fell well below the standard that might
reasonably have been expected of someone in his position at the time. As Head of Air Vehicle and a LOD
holder during the period 2003-2005, Mike Eagles had responsibility for managing the preparation of the NSC.
He simply did not do so at all. Michael Eagles failed to give adequate priority, care and personal attention to
the NSC task. He failed properly to utilise the resources available to him within the Nimrod IPT to ensure the
airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet. He failed to give the NSC the priority it deserved. In doing so, like George
Baber, he too failed to make safety his top priority.
Frank Walsh (Safety Manager)
11.267 Frank Walsh, the Safety Manager, bears a significant share of the blame for the failures of the Nimrod IPT in
relation to the NSC.
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