The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
10A.185 Given the importance of the meeting, it was unfortunate that the three relevant senior figures from the three
organisations, Witness B [BAE Systems] of BAE Systems, Martyn Mahy of QinetiQ and Michael Eagles of the
Nimrod IPT were not present or (in the latter case) only present for part of the meeting.
What had been planned for the meeting?
10A.186 It is necessary to examine what was originally planned for the ‘Customer Acceptance Conference’ and how
this changed at the last minute. It was envisaged from the outset that BAE Systems would hold a detailed
two-day conference with the IPT at the end of the Phase 2 project “to go through all the hazards with IPT”.
The original Phase 2 Proposal provided that a final “Customer Review” meeting would be held following the
completion of Phase 2 during which BAE Systems would formally present its findings to the Nimrod IPT “for
acceptance”. Subsequently, on 29 April 2004, it was expressly agreed with Frank Walsh that there would
be a two-day meeting to “review” the hazards with the IPT, including two Section Heads, in order to classify
them further, e.g. as ‘Managed’. This final meeting was referred to in the minutes of an internal BAE Systems
meeting on 24 May 2004 as an “’Ending Conference’ where each Hazard will be reviewed”. It appears,
therefore, to have been axiomatic at this stage that the final meeting would comprise a detailed review of
every hazard in the Acceptance Conference with the client.
10A.187 On 22 July 2004, Richard Oldfield and Chris Lowe had discussed the planned ‘customer acceptance’ meeting
with Frank Walsh. It is noteworthy that the draft agenda envisaged the entire first day being spent on
“Functions & Zonal Hazard Log”. It is perhaps indicative of Michael Eagles’ peripheral role that Frank Walsh’s
list of probable IPT attendees at the ‘Customer Acceptance Conference’ did not initially feature Michael
Eagles, although the later Agenda did.
10A.188 On 27 July 2004, Chris Lowe circulated a ‘Meeting Call Notice’ to the 10 BAE Systems’ staff involved in the
NSC Phase 2 informing them that a two day “Final Hazard and Documentation Review Conference” was to
take place on Tuesday 31 August and Wednesday 1 September 2004 with the Nimrod IPT. He explained that
the purpose of the conference was “to review in detail” the hazard log contents, together with the other
reports and final baseline reports “in the presence of Nimrod IPT representatives”. He emphasised that BAE
Systems’ aim or strategy was to get the task signed off by the customer:
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“The exit criteria from the conference will be BAE SYSTEMS engineering disciplines and
customer buy-in and sign-off of both baseline reports, the specific reports tasked, and
completeness of the hazard log, together with accepting the validity of the recommendations
(irrespective of whether the MOD wish to take up those recommendations)...” (emphasis
added)
10A.189 The proposed agenda included on the first day a “review” of the final BLSC Reports and on the second day
a “full review” of the Hazard Log contents. A Provisional Agenda was subsequently circulated on 19 August
2004 which simply included a “Review of Hazards Log and Mitigation of Identified Hazards” on the first
afternoon; to which was then added “...and Summary of Recommendations”.
10A.190 Chris Lowe volunteered in interview that, although by mid-August there was a possibility of over-run and the
task not being completed, “….it perhaps wasn’t inappropriate to run the [customer acceptance] conference
because it would have been difficult to shift it”. This was an incautious, but telling, remark. The truth is that,
by 16 August 2004, over-running was certain since only 68% of the work was complete; 75 but it would
have been very difficult to delay the Customer Acceptance Conference without seriously disappointing the
customer. What he and BAE Systems should have done, however, was to come clean with the Nimrod IPT
at this stage and seek further time in which to complete the project properly. Regrettably, they did not do
so. Instead, Chris Lowe insisted the Mech Systems and other Departments made a “final push”. 76 It is not
surprising that, as a result, work on the remaining hazards (including Hazard H73) was rushed, and many
hazards were left “Open” and “Unclassified” using the expedient that Electrical Systems needed to carry
out “further analytical techniques”. Regrettably, BAE Systems felt unable or unwilling to ‘come clean’ at
the Customer Acceptance Conference as to just how much work had in fact been completed (see further
below).
75 As recorded in Witness K [BAE Systems]’s notes.
76 Ibid.