The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction
‘Cuts’
Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
8. Severe financial and resource pressures were placed on the MOD in the period 1998 to 2006. These
included: (i) a 3% cut in the budget over the period 2000 to 2003; (ii) a 3% annual assumed efficiency
saving in the period 2000 to 2004; and (iii) in the case of the Defence Logistics Organisation, a
‘Strategic Goal’ of a 20% saving in output costs in the period 2000 to 2005/06.
‘Change’
9. A major programme of organisational ‘change-upon-change’ was initiated by the Strategic Defence
Review driven, in large part, by financial imperatives. This included the following initiatives:
(1) ‘Smart’ Procurement;
(2) Equipment Capability Customer;
(3) Defence Procurement Agency;.
(4) Defence Logistics Organisation;
(5) Integrated Project Teams;
(6) Defence Aviation Repair Agency;
(7) Joint Service and Air Publications;
(8) ‘Partnership’ with Industry;
(9) ‘End-to-End’; and
(10) ‘Leaning’.
10. There followed further waves of change, including:
(1) ‘Re-energising’ the DLO Change Programme in 2002;
(2) New DLO ‘Change’ Programme in 2002;
(3) 20-40% Manpower reduction programme commenced in 2002;
(4) Defence Logistics Transformation Programme in 2004;
(5) ‘Streamlining End to End’ Review in 2004;
(6) Expansion of ‘Leaning’ programme in 2004 onwards;
(7) Further savings required by the Gerson Report in 2004;
(8) Phase 2 of DLO re-structuring programme in 2005;
(9) Further MOD manpower reductions required in 2006; and
(10) Planning for eventual formation of DE&S (in 2007).
‘Dilution’
11. The continuous organisational change during the period 2000 to 2006 led to a marked dilution of
the safety and airworthiness regime and culture in the MOD, for three reasons. First, during this
period there was an inexorable shift in the MOD from a ‘safety and airworthiness culture’ to a
‘business culture’. Second, the organisational changes in the MOD led to a safety and airworthiness
regime which was organisationally complex, convoluted, confused and “seemingly dysfunctional”.
Third, meanwhile, there was also a steady dismantling of some of the important features of the
safety and airworthiness regime which had previously existed:
(1) Abolition of the “Chief Engineer RAF”;
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