The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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(1) BAE Systems’ attitude to the NSC was flawed from the outset: it assumed that the Nimrod was
‘safe anyway’ because of its long record and approached the NSC as essentially a documentary,
rather than an analytical, exercise.
(2) BAE Systems failed to carry out a proper ‘feasibility study’.
(3) BAE Systems failed to ensure its personnel were properly trained, experienced and competent
for the task.
(4) BAE Systems failed to ensure vital operator (i.e. RAF) involvement.
(5) BAE Systems failed to ensure continuity of personnel.
(6) BAE Systems’ project planning was poor.
(7) BAE Systems’ Phase 1 work was superficial and inadequate.
(8) BAE Systems under-estimated the resources required for Phase 2.
(9) BAE Systems’ personnel and task management of Phase 2 was poor and there were personality
clashes which led to further delays.
(10) BAE Systems’ promises as to completion were unreasonably optimistic.
(11) BAE Systems’ management exerted unreasonable pressure on its personnel to meet the
deadline and the final Phase 2 work was increasingly rushed and corners were cut.
(12) BAE Systems used inappropriate data to sentence risks (including Hazard H73).
(13) When presenting the results of its work at the ‘Customer Acceptance Conference’, BAE Systems
misrepresented that it had completed the task and deliberately did not disclose to the Nimrod
IPT or QinetiQ the actual percentage figures for the large proportion of hazards which it had
left “Open” and “Unclassified” or otherwise draw attention to the large gap remaining in its
analysis.
(14) BAE Systems’ representation that it had carried out an “independent review” of its NSC work
was an exaggeration.
(15) BAE Systems’ BLSC Reports gave the impression to the cursory reader that the aircraft could
be “deemed acceptably safe to operate” without substantial further work.
(16) When presenting its work to the Platform Safety Working Group, BAE Systems again deliberately
kept quiet about the large percentage of hazards it had left “Open” and “Unclassified”.
(17) BAE Systems’ analysis, assessment and categorisation of Hazard H73 was seriously
erroneous.
(18) The general standard of BAE Systems’ analysis, assessment and categorisation of the hazards
was lamentable: the Pro-Formas (1) lacked consistency; (2) contained numerous significant
factual errors; (3) contained numerous examples of poor or inefficacious mitigation; (4)
demonstrated generally low levels of analysis; and (5) showed the increasing effects of time
constraints.
(19) BAE Systems’ Fire & Explosion Report was superficial and slapdash and failed properly to
address the risk of a catastrophic fire in the No. 7 Tank Dry Bay (i.e. Hazard H73).