The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Serial
Recommendations Status
Number
22 The connections of the No 1 tank vent pipes be modified Action Continuing – Recommendation Reopened.
to reduce the risk of fuel leakage.
This recommendation arose from concern that, as the No 1 tank reached full during AAR, fuel
could enter the vent pipe. The connection of the No 1 tank to the vent system was not deemed
adequate to ensure no fuel leakage in such a situation. Although this recommendation was
initially closed, as the Nimrod no longer undertakes AAR, the tear-down of XV 236 specifically
examined the structure of the vent pipe connection and determined that the design could be
improved.
436
If the aircraft manoeuvres with the No 1 tank close to full, small amounts of fuel can also enter
the vent system. Any leak would be of a significantly smaller quantity than might occur during
AAR and the cross-feed/ SCP ducts no longer pose a potential source of ignition. Additionally the
vent system is checked for leaks during equalised maintenance. As an interim measure RTI/334
has been issued, to ensure that a correct seal is achieved on the vent pipe, thus ensuring the risk
remains ALARP.
STI/Nimrod/944A introduces a revised design for the connection and was issued on 14 Aug
after a successful trial installation carried out on XV226. The planned completion date for the
modification is 13 Oct 09.
Recommendation Closed.
This modification has now been incorporated.
23 The drainage of the lower panel in the No 7 tank dry
bay be improved to prevent any accumulation of fuel.
Recommendation Rejected.
24 A crash-protected means of recording aircraft position
and intercom voice is introduced to the Nimrod.
It was determined that the cost of implementing this recommendation would be disproportionate
to the remaining life of the aircraft. Moreover, it could not be fitted to the Nimrod fleet within the
remaining life of the aircraft.
As mitigation it was also noted that XV 230’s BOI had been able to extract considerable data from
the aircraft mission tape despite the fact that it was not crash protected. DARS has added a note
to its web site instructions for Incident Officers at crash sites to ensure that all magnetic media is
recovered for analysis.
Recommendation Closed.
This recommendation has been accepted and the Defence Aviation Safety Centre has already
updated its website with the relevant information.
25 The Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC) should
investigate the provision of details of type specific
emergency equipment (ADR, etc) and key internal
components (for example the ADR tape unit and
housing) on their website to enable Post Crash MOD
Incident Officer (PCMIO) to provide guidance to search
teams.