The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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provide oversight of FS Safety to help inform strategic Airworthiness management decisions (e.g. addressing
a rise in FS-related fatalities across whole defence aviation domain).
Recommendations H
21.139
In order to achieve this objective, I recommend as follows:
Recommendation 21.H.1: Each AOA shall establish its own Flight Safety organisation, headed by a
Senior Operator, responsible for the delivery/deployment of Flight Safety throughout the AOA. The
Regulator’s role in Flight Safety management shall be that of central oversight, to inform strategic
Airworthiness decisions/direction and to act as the ‘high level’ governing authority for Flight Safety.
21.140
For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 21.G.1: (1) Each AOA will need to re-establish a FS
Inspectorate role to complement the Standards and Evaluations Teams who monitor flying procedures and
competence; In the case of the RAF a single Flight Safety organisation shall be formed under the command
of Cinc Air. (2) The FS organisations will be required to look across all disciplines that influence Flight Safety;
and (3) The Senior Operator will also have responsibility for managing the self-regulation of flight operations
and to provide assurance to the Duty Holder that the equipment is being used safely and, where necessary
highlighting Airworthiness concerns.
Recommendation 21.H.2: The Regulator will establish a clearer distinction between the disciplines of
Airworthiness and Flight Safety.
21.141 For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 21.G.2: (1) Airworthiness is ensuring aircraft platforms
are safe to use (this involves a dual responsibility of DE&S and AOAs, namely: the responsibility of DE&S to
provide safe equipment and the responsibility of AOA Duty Holders: (a) to maintain Airworthiness; (b) to
operate the equipment in accordance with approved procedures; and (c) to use appropriately trained and
competent personnel; (2) Flight Safety involves ensuring aircraft platforms are used safely (a responsibility of
the AOA Duty Holders alone).
I. Clarification of Integrated Project Team Responsibilities
Current position and shortcomings
21.142
21.143
The AOAs are supported by DE&S IPTS who, following the amalgamation of the DLO and DPA to form DE&S,
now have responsibility for the equipment through life, i.e. including procurement and in-service support.
Although the AOAs fund their respective IPTs, Joint Business Agreements (JBAs) provide the mechanism for
agreeing output requirements and for monitoring performance. The IPTs in turn set up their own contracts
with Industry to provide Depth support, an arrangement that means neither Depth nor the IPTs primarily face
the Unit level users who operate the equipment.
DE&S has grown into a dominant organisation within the MOD. The emergence of DE&S has tilted the
centre of gravity away from AOAs, such that the latter are considered part of the process of the former
rather than vice-versa. Many IPTs have extended their remit regarding fleet-wide issues and policy and have
become increasingly involved at a local and tactical level in issues specific to individual platforms. The remit
of IPTs has ‘evolved’ to such an extent that many seek to exert control over the Forward (i.e. Duty Holder)
environment notwithstanding that they are neither empowered, nor best placed, to manage this arena. The
tail is beginning to wag the dog.
CDM has assumed the
21.144 de facto position of senior ‘Duty Holder’, even though his remit is limited to the
provision of safe equipment. This has strengthened the mistaken perception that Airworthiness is primarily a
DE&S responsibility.