The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Summary
19.35
19.36
19.34.19 ”Training Standards
Chapter 19 – Shortcomings of Current System
– Sparse availability of platforms, coupled with shortage of qualified instructors (Nimrod
QFIs in particular) means that aircraft conversion training is sporadic and characterised by
cancelled sorties and the lack of opportunity to consolidate skills. ...
– ... Falling levels of broad spectrum experience coupled with ‘parking’ of some skills raises
safety concerns amongst aircrew and ground crew.
– ...Across the fleets, conversion courses run months behind schedule due to aircraft unavailability,
leaving large gaps in the flying programme and little opportunity for crews to
reinforce training. Moreover, at RAF Kinloss the loss of most of the QFIs on the OCU (to
local operator) jeopardises future trained output, and thus the viability of the MR2 fleet. ...”
(page A-7).
19.34.20 ”Moral and Motivation
– It was singularly clear to the [Capability Health Check] team the commitment and the pride
in their work – to see aircraft get airborne – remains paramount amongst maintenance and
other support personnel. Much of this is down to inspired leadership at the SNCO level....
– Personal and professional pride means that personnel claim to be staying for increasingly
longer hours to turn aircraft around or to carry out other support tasks, but there is a
palpable sense, expressed by a significant number interviewed, that the RAF was ‘letting
them down’ by agreeing to the culture of continuous change – with no obvious end in
sight.
– Near-continuous change initiatives over recent years have created a climate of deep
uncertainty, mistrust of enterprise and a sense of ‘constant turbulence’; moreover
continuous change does not permit the establishment of a baseline to measure logistical
and personnel support required to conduct operations. Additionally, the presumptive
language of ‘management speak’ and ‘JPA civvie-speak’ is alienating our personnel – at all
levels interviewed. ...” (page A-8).
In summary, in my view, the MOD has nurtured and endured an Airworthiness regulatory system that lacks
coherence, clarity, ownership, and authority, which rates poorly against the other Airworthiness models used
by other military forces (such as the US Air Force and the Australian Defence Force), and by the Civil Sector;
and which lacks the clarity of expression and ownership afforded by e.g. Defence Nuclear regulation. There
are, moreover, major problems in the areas of Safety Cases, Aged Aircraft, Personnel, relations with Industry,
Procurement and, most importantly, Culture, which need to be addressed.
The case for substantial reform of the Airworthiness regime in the MOD is overwhelming and urgent.
Recommendations
19.37 I make detailed Recommendations for a New Military Airworthiness Regime ( Chapter 21), together
with Recommendations to address the problems with Safety Cases (Chapter 22), Aged Aircraft
(Chapter 23), Personnel (Chapter 24), relations with Industry (Chapter 25), Procurement (Chapter 26)
and, most importantly, Safety Culture (Chapter 27). I also make a number of final Recommendations
(Chapter 28).
19.38
I turn first, however, to make Recommendations regarding the key Principles for an effective airworthiness
system (Chapter 20).
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