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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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21.114<br />

21.115<br />

Type experience<br />

21.116<br />

Summary<br />

21.117<br />

Objective<br />

21.118<br />

Chapter 21 – New Military Airworthiness Regime<br />

their own accidents. <strong>The</strong> answer is to remove the convening power to the independent authority of the<br />

Regulator.<br />

Third, it is vital that the results of military accident investigations are collated, analysed and the wider trends<br />

and lessons learned disseminated across the relevant domains and Defence generally. Currently, the manner<br />

in which BOI Reports are handled is somewhat haphazard. This is another reason why the SI process should<br />

be in the hands of a central Regulator.<br />

<strong>The</strong> current SI process is, in any event, not ideal for dealing with accident investigations when Industry is<br />

involved. Industry may be involved in military accidents either through Industry supporting or operating the<br />

aircraft as part of their Depth role on the MOB, or where military aircraft are being flown by civilian crews,<br />

or where Service crews are operating a civil-registered platform. Whilst the technical, operating and support<br />

issues are the same, the process associated with a SI versus a civil accident investigation are quite different<br />

and have different legal requirements.<br />

It is important, in my view, that the engineering and operational members of SIs have relevant experience<br />

on type. <strong>The</strong> pool of suitable candidates for appointment will probably have spent much of their career<br />

operating/maintaining the aircraft concerned. Aircrew will have undertaken a conversion course (usually six<br />

months) to fly the aircraft. Aircrew and engineers associated with type will normally have extensive experience<br />

of the aircraft, its operations and diagnosing problems with the aircraft in normal day-to-day operation. <strong>The</strong><br />

three members of an SI should have a comprehensive knowledge of the aircraft, its systems and the normal<br />

operating procedures. It would take much longer for an uninitiated investigator to acquire the necessary<br />

background information, let alone to garner a full understanding of the aircraft. Civil and military aircraft are<br />

different. Civil aircraft have broad similarities. Military aircraft differ markedly. Larger military aircraft tend to<br />

be extensively modified and are often older designs than those in civil use. Fast jets are completely different<br />

to larger aircraft and have nothing in common with civilian aircraft. Military aircraft operations are (on the<br />

whole) completely different to civilian operations. <strong>The</strong> SI team understand the particular regulations within<br />

which the aircraft and its crews work; they also understand the stresses of military operations and the context<br />

within which the aircraft will have been operating. <strong>The</strong> majority of crashes are the result of human factors,<br />

engineering issues or operating factors (e.g. bird strike). Determining what happened is a result of analysing<br />

available data about the crash/incident and the people best placed to do so are those who are ‘educated’<br />

both in the aircraft’s systems and the way in which it is operated. Currently, what is missing is a knowledge<br />

of how to go about proving theories, what tests might be useful and practical etc. <strong>The</strong> AAIB is (and has<br />

been) a valuable source of guidance to previous BOIs carrying out military air investigations as well as often<br />

conducting a parallel/joint inquiry with AAIB inspectors appointed to assist BOIs. In the case of XV230, it<br />

produced a report which coincided in all essential detail with that of the BOI.<br />

In summary, therefore: (1) Currently, the SI system is not independent and seen to be independent. It should<br />

be. (2) Currently, there is no joint military accident technical investigation team that has the skill set and<br />

training to investigate the whole spectrum of military aircraft accidents. <strong>The</strong>re should be. (3) Currently, there<br />

is no satisfactory system for drawing together the results of BOIs and learning the lessons of BOIs across<br />

Defence. <strong>The</strong>re should be. (4) It is important that engineering and operational members of SIs have experience<br />

on type. and (5) Even closer liaison between the military and the AAIB would be valuable.<br />

It is important that SIs are, and are seen to be, non-partisan, independent, skilled and professional investigations<br />

in which the Services, Industry and the Public can have complete confidence. Presidents and members of BOIs<br />

need to be given appropriate education, training and support to be able to carry out their investigatory role<br />

525

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