The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

1999: ISD ‘slipped’ to May 2005
14.4
Chapter 14 – Procurement
In late 1998, British Aerospace formally notified the MOD that it had encountered problems with the
programme and was unlikely to meet the intended ISD. As a result, the main development and production
contact was renegotiated. The EAC approved the changes in April 1999 and the contract amendment was
agreed with British Aerospace in May 1999. The ISD was ‘slipped’ by 55 months to March 2005. The first
flight was scheduled for December 2001, with delivery of the first aircraft in August 2004. The ISD was
defined as delivery of the seventh aircraft. The original ISD had been set because of expected equipment
obsolescence of the MR2 and yet there were no warnings of the problems of continuing with the MR2. As
a result of the renegotiation, the programme showed a saving on the original budget. British Aerospace Plc
became BAE Systems Plc (BAE Systems) in November 1999 on the merger with Marconi Electronic Systems.
2001: ISD ‘slipped’ to December 2005
14.5
14.6
In 2001, the first flight of the first development aircraft slipped to June 2002 and the ISD to December 2005.
The operational impact of the ISD delay was described in the National Audit Office (NAO) Major Projects
Report (MPR) as follows:
“The consequence of the Nimrod MRA4 in-service slip is that the Nimrod MR2 will
remain in service until mid-2008. This slip will delay introduction of the improved Anti-
Submarine and Anti-Surface Unit Warfare capability of the Nimrod MRA4 and will require
the ageing Nimrod MR2 fleet to be maintained in service longer than expected. The
operational impact of this slippage will be partly mitigated by measures already in hand
to introduce upgrades to some MR2 systems, notably Replacement Acoustic Processors
(RAP), navigation systems, data links and other communications to address interoperability
issues. The RAP programme has benefited by making use of acoustic processors procured
for Nimrod MRA4.” 5
After the publication of the NAO 2001 MPR, a routine review of the requirement for future maritime
reconnaissance capability concluded that only 18 aircraft were required for the operational task. In the NAO
2002 MPR it was noted that the MOD had concluded a Heads of Agreement with BAE Systems. In order to
mitigate risk of further delay, it was agreed to take an incremental approach to aircraft delivery. The NAO
2002 MPR again explained the operational impact of the ISD (additional wording to the above paragraph is
underlined):
“The consequence of the Nimrod MRA4 in-service slip is that the ageing Nimrod MR2 will
remain in service until mid 2008, longer than expected. This slip will delay introduction
of the improved Anti-Submarine and Anti-Surface Unit Warfare capability of the Nimrod
MRA4. Nimrod MRA4 has a world wide autonomous operational capability with a reach
extending to some 6,000 miles. This is a considerable improvement on the current MR2
capability which is some 3800 miles. Other capability improvements over MR2 include
time on station, a major improvement in overall sensor performance and weapon carrying
capability. Utilising state-of-the-art equipment, the crew complement has been reduced by
25%. The operational impact of this slippage will be partly mitigated by measures already
in hand to introduce upgrades to some MR2 systems, notably Replacement Acoustic
Processors (RAP), navigation systems, datalinks and other communications to address
interoperability issues. The RAP programme has benefited by making use of the acoustic
processors procured for Nimrod MR4.” 6
5 NAO Major Project Report 2001 dated 19 November 2001, page 120.
6 NAO Major Project Report 2002 dated 2 December 2002, page 120.
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